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

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THE APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION *EXSUL FAMILIA*[1]

Part I

1. *Foreword.* The Constitution, after a very brief reference, by way of introduction, to the examples given to the refugees and the exiles of every age by the Holy Family of Nazareth, itself once a refugee family in Egypt, and to the protection which they can hope to receive from that family, recalls the necessity that to all those who for one reason or another are constrained to live far from their fatherland, often in the midst of people whose culture and customs are different, the assistance and guidance of the priest shall not be wanting. In confirmation of this some weighty words of St. Augustine are quoted.[2]

2. *The Church and the care of exiles and pilgrims from the most remote times to the eighteenth century.* The first title has for its subject the maternal solicitude of the Church toward the emigrants. It opens with certain historical references. Thus, it mentions St. Ambrose who broke up the sacred vessels to ransom those who had been deported after the defeat of Valens at Adrianopolis, in order to liberate them not only from material but also from the spiritual harm which was much more serious than the former. It refers also to the efforts put forth to convert and to fit into Christian civilization the barbarians who had invaded regions populated by flourishing Christian communities. It makes reference, too, to the zeal of the Orders instituted for the liberation of those who had been carried off and were held as slaves. It recalls, likewise, the assistance given to the first colonizers of the New World and the efforts of the Church in favor of the Negroes snatched from their respective native tribes and made the object of a shameful commerce in the ports of Europe and of America as well. Important Acts of Leo XIII and of Benedict XV on this point are cited.

3. *The* Scholae peregrinorum *of the eighth century and the hospices of the eleventh century.* Particular stress is given also to the care which the Church has always taken that spiritual assist-

[1] *AAS,* XLIV, 649-704.

[2] *Ep.* 228, 8 (*MPL,* XXXIII, 1016 ff.).

ance to pilgrims, exiles, and refugees should be provided, in so far as possible, by priests who were of their own nation and who spoke their language. Cited as a magnificent example are the *Scholae peregrinorum* which, from the eighth century on, were established in Rome near the sepulchre of St. Peter on the Vatican hill for the Saxons, the Lombards, the Franks, and the Frisians. Priests of those nations living there permanently received their fellow countrymen and offered them every assistance even to the point of taking care of their burial, in case of death, in the cemetery annexed to their respective churches. These *Scholae* were succeeded by the monasteries and the hospices annexed thereto for pilgrims coming from Abyssinia, from Hungary, and from Armenia.

The Confraternities, the National Churches, the Fourth Lateran Council. The point is confirmed also by the national hospices, hospitals, churches, and confraternities which were most numerous especially in Rome. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) made of this a general obligation upon the Bishops in whose dioceses there existed groups of the faithful who were of different language and rite. This norm, which the Code of Canon Law has not overlooked, later finds application in the establishment of national parishes, well known in the United States (the most recent examples of this type of parish which we might mention are the Chinese parishes established in the Philippines and the Italian parishes at Nairobi, Kenya, and at Montreal, Canada), and in the establishment of Ordinariates (Eparchies) for the faithful of Oriental Rite.

4. Although there have never been times in which the Church has slackened her maternal solicitude toward those who lived far from their fatherland, for obvious reasons of brevity the Document gives a concise summary of the principal works accomplished in this field of the apostolate by the Sovereign Pontiffs, beginning with those nearer to us.

5. *Pius VI and Pius VII, and the refugees of the French Revolution.* The Constitution gives a full and precise documentation, largely still unpublished and gathered from the recesses of the Secret Archives of the Vatican, of the charity of the Apostolic See toward the French,[3] concerning the activity of Pius VI and Pius VII toward the poor exiles of the French Revolution.

[3] *De charitate Sedis Apostolicae erga Gallos.*

6. *Pius IX and the Italians in London.* From the reign of Pius IX it recalls the support given by him to Bl. Vincent Pallotti in the foundation at London of a permanent establishment, which is still active, for assistance to immigrants coming from Italy. In fact, St. Peter's Church was made an Italian national parish in 1952.

7. *Leo XIII and the migrant workers.* It was in the nineteenth century, however, that mass emigrations of the people of Europe, and especially of Italy, toward the Americas took place.

It was then that Leo XIII, the strong defender of the dignity of human labor and of its rights, took most particular care of the workers who went to foreign lands, to distant regions, in search of work and of means of subsistence for themselves and for their families.

In the very first year of his Pontificate (1878), he was solicitous to approve the *St. Raphaëls-Verein zum Schutze katholischer Auswanderer* which had been established on Sept. 13, 1871, by the Bishops of Germany for assistance to German emigrants. This society, with offices in the ports of embarkation and debarkation, in the following years took care also of emigrants of other counties, e.g. of Belgium, Austria and Italy. In 1887 he approved the proposal of the Servant of God Giovanni Scalabrini, then Bishop of Piacenza, to gather in a religious Institute some zealous priests who intended to dedicate themselves to the spiritual assistance of the multitudes of Italians who had migrated to America. It was thus that Scalabrini first of all founded a College for the preparation of priests for that important ministry and then established the religious Institute of the Missionaries of St. Charles.

8. The famous letter, *Quam aerumnosa,* to the Archbishops and Bishops of America, whereby the immortal Pontiff initiated very many undertakings for good, dates from Dec. 10, 1888. Priests and religious of both sexes dedicated themselves to assistance to the emigrants. Sodalities arose; protectorates were formed for assistance to refugees coming from Ireland, Austria, Hungary, Belgium, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. Numerous national parishes arose, too.

9. June 19, 1900, Leo XIII, through a Circular of the Secretariate of State, likewise laid down wise norms for certain Archbishops of Italy to regulate spiritual assistance to the migrants who only temporarily betook themselves to other countries of

Europe. Msgr. Bonomelli, Bishop of Cremona, then founded the *"Opera di assistenza agli Italiani emigranti in Europa"* through the beneficent influence of which there were founded, especially in Switzerland, Austria, Germany, and France, the *"Missioni Cattoliche"* for the migrants, with their annexed operations of assistance, of beneficence, and of instruction, and flourishing secretariates. This undertaking which had done so much good was, at the death of Bonomelli, entrusted by Benedict XV to the Bishop of Vicenza, Msgr. Rodolfi, and later by Pius XI to a Superior elected by the Sacred Consistorial Congregation.

Likewise to be ascribed to the merit of Leo XIII is the fact that he pointed out to Mother Frances Xavier Cabrini the road to the West rather than that toward the Orient. From her untiring efforts derive the many institutions in America for the support and the education of the children of Italians, the hospitals, the orphanages, etc., which have well merited for her the title, recognized to her by Pius XI who enrolled her among the Blessed, of "Mother of the Italian Emigrants."

10. *Bl. Pius X, regulator of spiritual assistance to the emigrants.* The merit of having given an organic and general arrangement to the spiritual assistance of emigrants belongs to Bl. Pius X, who as a pastor in Salzano had taken care of his parishioners who emigrated, and as Sovereign Pontiff extended his apostolic solicitude, which thus became universal, to all emigrants. This is exhaustively proved by a number of Acts, among others the letter to the Archbishop of New York, Feb. 6, 1904, with regard to the founding of a seminary for clerics who were sons of Italian emigrants; the speech to the Argentine pilgrims given Nov. 18, 1908; the letter to the Archbishops and Bishops of Brazil, of June 6, 1911; and the others to the Superior of the Missionaries of St. Charles, to the President of the Universal Pious Antonian Society and to the Rector of the Catholic Society for immigrants who had settled in Canada.

He approved, in 1905, the Society of the Missionaries of Emigration of St. Anthony of Padua, founded by Fr. Giovanni Giacomo Coccolo. Through the Secretariate of State and the Sacred Consistorial Congregation he encouraged the foundation, under the care of the Ordinaries, of Committees and Protectorates in favor of the emigrants. Through the Sacred Congregation of the Sacra-

ments he issued an Instruction to the Bishops regarding the testimonial concerning the *status liber* and the announcement of a marriage which had been contracted, to obviate the inconveniences which easily derive from the less strict observance on the part of the emigrants of the canonical norms on matters of marriage.

In favor of the priests and faithful of the Ruthenian Rite who had migrated to the United States of America he chose a Bishop of their own Rite and gave special norms for them. He selected another Ruthenian Bishop for Canada. Further, he approved the association founded at Toronto for spiritual assistance to Ruthenian Catholics. He laid down rules for the mutual relations in Canada between the Bishops, priests and faithful of the Latin Rite and those of the Ruthenian rite. He gave to the Rumanian Catholic Episcopate the church of *SS.mo Salvatore al vicolo delle Coppelle* in Rome.

11. *Establishment of an Office in the Sacred Consistorial Congregation.* The most important Act, however, in this connection, was the establishment of a particular Office or Section in the Sacred Consistorial Congregation *for the spiritual care of emigrants of the Latin Rite.*[4] In that same Act he transferred to the Sacred Consistorial Congregation the competence also over emigrant priests, which had belonged to the Sacred Congregation of the Council, except for the competence of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide over priests of Oriental Rite. From this came the laws promulgated by the Sacred Consistorial Congregation to govern the emigration of priests who desired to transfer from certain regions of Europe to America and the Philippine Islands or to dedicate themselves to the assistance of Italian emigrants.

12. It is sufficient to cite here that most important document, the Decree *Ethnographica studia* of Mar. 25, 1914, the norms of which, adapted to the Code of Canon Law, together with the Decree *Magni semper negotii* of Dec. 30, 1918, kept their force intact until the promulgation of the *Exsul Familia,* and were extended to the Orientals by the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church and to the Latins who desired to emigrate to Australia and New Zealand by the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, to which those territories are subject.

[4] *Motu proprio,* March 19, 1914.

13. *The college of priests for Italian emigration.* Finally, he founded at Rome the *Collegio dei Sacerdoti per gli emigranti Italiani* and, in his own hand, he drew up its statutes on the very eve of his happy death.

14. *The work of Benedict XV.* So great a heritage of good works was accepted with all care by Benedict XV, notwithstanding the enormous preoccupations of the war. In fact, as his first act he set aside as the seat of the aforesaid *Collegio* certain rooms in the building which had been the seat of the Roman Seminary at the Apollinaris. Next he had letters sent to the Ordinaries of Italy and of America for the collection of funds wherewith to provide for the support of the *Collegio.*

15. *The "Emigrants' Day."* He authorized the Bishops of Italy to celebrate an *annual* Emigrants' Day and invited each pastor to apply one Mass a year for the works connected with emigration. He recommended to the Bishops of Calabria the foundation of ecclesiastical protectorates.

In a letter on this point he called the attention of the Archbishop of São Paolo and of the other bishops of Brazil to the urgent need to be vigilant in order that the immigrants from Europe should not abandon their Catholic Faith. On the same point he wrote, on Dec. 10, 1920, to the Bishop of Trenton in the United States of America and praised him for having built a church destined for the Italian colony, expressing the hope that the Italians who had migrated to the United States might find everywhere such comfort.

16. *The Prelate for Italian Emigration.* He was concerned likewise with the so-called internal migration, e.g. of the women workers in the rice fields. In 1920, on Oct. 23, he established a Prelate for Italian Emigration to whom he entrusted also the direction of the College of Priests.

17. *The Office for Prisoners of War.* Extremely solicitous for the prisoners of war, from the very beginning of his Pontificate, with the Act of Dec. 21, 1914, he invited all the Ordinaries of dioceses in which prisoners of war were to be found to depute priests expert in their languages to take every care of them.

18. *The Ordinary for Refugees.* Refugees of war were also the object of the solicitude of Benedict XV. In fact, Sept. 3, 1918, he established a Common Ordinary for Refugees in Italy. He invited

the Bishops of Germany and of Central Europe to discuss in their episcopal conferences the best means to provide for spiritual assistance to the innumerable refugees, strengthening the influence, already so beneficent, of the Society of St. Raphael. In 1921 he named as Patron of the activities for religious assistance to German Catholics who had migrated to Italy, the Archbishop of Cologne. This activity subsequently had a second patron in the Bishop of Osnabrueck and extended its care to Germans who had migrated both to the West and to the East of Europe.

19. *The Mexican refugees.* He recommended warmly[5] to the charity of the Catholics of the United States of America the Bishops, priests, religious of both sexes, and the countless members of the faithful who were refugees from Mexico, victims of the persecution. He was particularly pleased that the Archbishop of Baltimore had established a seminary for young Mexicans who were aspirants to the priesthood (March 17, 1915).

20. *The Orientals.* In favor of the Catholics of Oriental Rite he promoted spiritual assistance for the Greek-Ruthenians who had migrated to South America. He established in the monastery of Grottaferrata, near Rome, a seminary for Italo-Greek children and created in Italy, for the faithful of Greek Rite, who were refugees from Epirus and Albania in consequence of the worsening of the Turkish persecution, the diocese of Lungro in Calabria.

Finally, we should mention the proclamation by Benedict XV of the Blessed Virgin of Loreto as Patron of all those who undertake voyages by air and the special favors granted to them by the present Pontiff, happily reigning, by the extension of Canon 883 of the Code of Canon Law.

21. *Pius XI and his efforts for the Orientals.* The first and most affectionate cares of Pius XI for those who emigrate were directed toward the Orientals. The Constitution repeats the touching words with which, on Dec. 24, 1922, the Pope announced to the Sacred College of Cardinals that he had received as a present of the Divine Infant four hundred little orphan girls, refugees from Armenia, who were being lodged and fed in the Papal Palace at Castel Gandolfo. To all is known the solicitude which Pius XI had for the Russians. Only the care which he took of refugees of Slav Rite is recalled here. The direction thereof he entrusted first to the Com-

[5] Letter to the Bishop of San Antonio, Nov. 25, 1914.

mission *Pro Russia,* later to a Section established for this purpose in the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church. Also to be remembered is the establishment of an Ordinariate (*Harbinensis Russorum*) in China; the assigning of the Church of St. Anthony the Hermit on the Esquiline, in Rome, to the faithful of Slav Rite; the foundation of the Russicum Seminary; the exhortations to the Bishops of Poland to take every care of the refugees from the Oriental regions, without distinction of language or of confessions; and the generous offerings turned over by the Pontiff for this purpose. For the faithful of Byzantine Rite he established in Sicily the Eparchy of *Piana dei Greci* assigning thereto parishes which had belonged to the archdioceses of Palermo and Monreale. For the Greek-Ruthenians in the United States of America and in Canada he issued opportune norms for the perfecting of those Ordinariates established by his predecessor.

22. *The Poles.* As for the emigrés of Latin Rite, the Poles are to be mentioned first. To them he wished to give a sign of particular benevolence by elevating to the rank of Basilica the national Polish Church of St. Josephat in Milwaukee and he assigned as Protector of all Polish emigrés the Archbishop of Gniezno.

23. *The Germans.* For the German emigrants he approved and favored the Society of the Holy Angels which had been established at Godesberg in imitation of the Pious Society of the Missionaries of St. Charles.

24. *The Spaniards.* In a memorable audience held Sept. 14, 1936, at Castel Gandolfo, he demonstrated all his paternal solicitude for the Bishops, priests, religious, and faithful, persecuted and driven from Spain.

25. *The Mexicans.* He, too, concerned himself with the Mexicans who had migrated to the United States of America, insisting with the Mexican Bishops that they should undertake opportune negotiations with the Bishops of the United States, exhorting them to collaborate with associations for Catholic Action.

26. *The Italians. The ticket of the emigrant.* As for the Italians, to be remembered are the norms wherewith he ordered wisely the efforts of the "Chaplains on Board" and of the "Migrants' Missionaries" in Europe. He wanted every Italian emigrant provided by his own pastor with a suitable "ecclesiastical ticket." He entrusted the direction of the Pious Society of the Missionaries of St. Charles (Scalabrinians) to the Sacred Consistorial Congrega-

tion, which restored to the Society the characteristics of a Religious Institute according to the intention of the Founder, Mons. Scalabrini.

Finally, Pius XI granted recognition to the work of the Apostleship of the Sea on April 17, 1922, which later Pius XII, happily reigning, entrusted to the supreme direction of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation.

27. *Pius XII. The Pope of Peace.* At this point the Constitution begins the exposition of the work of the Pontiff now happily reigning.

It begins by recalling the profound disturbances which were already taking place among the peoples of the world at the moment when Pius XII was raised to the Supreme Pontificate: the frenetic eagerness of certain nations to occupy the territory of others, the limits imposed on emigration, the forcible transfers of population, which caused enormous sorrows. Holy Church rose once again as "the one who presides over all the works of charity" and was, as always, a comfort to those who wept, a refuge for the persecuted and a home for exiles. Pius XII left nothing untried. For the persecuted Jews, too, he insured escape and a safe asylum.

28. *The Protector of the victims of war.* The Constitution refers to the generous efforts whereby the Pope worked even to the last, to avert the war. It passes then to treat of the gigantic labors directed toward softening the innumerable sufferings which followed for the victims of the cruel scourge and especially for the prisoners, the refugees, the deportees. The numerous offices founded for this purpose are barely mentioned: The Commission for Assistance, the Office for Information, the Pontifical Commission for Assistance to Refugees, the Pontifical Commission for Assistance, still active, with the title changed to Work of Pontifical Assistance in Italy, the Missions in Germany and in Austria.

29. *The Father of the Emigrants.* When the armed conflict ceased, the Office of Emigration, to which the Bishops' Resettlement Council, especially, gave precious support, was established. An observer was sent to the Office at Geneva. The Catholic International Commission for Emigration was also established at Geneva.

This rapid review is completed with a reference to the activity of the Nuncios, Internuncios, and Apostolic Delegates, of the

Bishops of the entire world, of the priests, of the Associations of Catholic Action and of all the other forms of apostolate, as well as to the willing and generous faithful who formed the Committees and Commissions to carry out everywhere the charitable initiatives of the Pope in favor of the refugees, the exiles and the deportees.

30. *The helper of the Palestinian refugees.* At the outbreak of the war in Palestine, in 1948, and on the occasion of the pitiable exodus of hundreds of thousands of peaceful citizens of those regions who, deprived of their all, were constrained to seek a refuge in Jordan, in Syria, in Lebanon, in Egypt, and in the region of Gaza, the Pope promptly established the Pontifical Commission for Palestine which even at present distributes to those poor Arab populations the assistance which the Catholic Near East Welfare Association, particularly, collects from the whole Catholic world.

31. *The appeals for the refugees.* After this rapid review of activities the Constitution reports certain passages from the Allocutions, the Letters, the Radio Messages, whereby the Pope did not cease to interest the Bishops, the national and international institutions, and governments themselves in taking to heart the very serious problem of the exiles and of the refugees. As an example are cited the Letter to the Bishops of Germany of Dec. 20, 1948, the Encyclical *Redemptoris nostri* of April 15, 1949, the Letter to the President of the National Catholic Welfare Conference of Dec. 24, 1948, and the Letter, in his own hand, to the Bishops of Australia of April 28, 1951. In the last two documents the Pope manifests his gratitude for the prompt and generous response to his appeals.

32. *The appeals for the emigrants.* There follows another precious collection of pontifical texts with regard to the right of emigration and the repeated appeals to the nations which have possibilities in this regard that they may open their doors to the peoples who live in lands which are overpopulated. Of these Japan is cited as an example. Of particular interest are the passages reported from the Radio Message of June 1, 1941, on the fiftieth anniversary of *Rerum novarum* and the Allocution delivered in the solemn audience granted to the Diplomatic Corps on Feb. 25, 1946, the discourse to the United States Senators forming the Committee on Immigration on March 14, 1946, to the High Com-

missioner for Refugees of the United Nations Organization on July 18, 1952.

33. *Christian Rome home of the refugees.* The accomplishments of the gigantic work of charity of Pius XII are barely enumerated, e.g. the fact that the Apostolic Palaces, especially the Vatican, the Lateran and the villa of Castel Gandolfo, became the home of countless refugees. The same can be said of the Seminaries and ecclesiastical Colleges and of the houses of the Religious, so that Sacred Rome was truly the seat and the domicile of charity.

34. *The renewal of spiritual assistance to emigrants of the Latin Rite.* On behalf of emigration are mentioned: the establishment, in his day, of Visitors for the various ethnic groups, the sending of numerous Migrants' Missionaries for assistance to Italian emigrants in Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland, Holland and Latin America, where some priests went spontaneously to augment the ranks of the local clergy. In this connection is to be remembered the *Obra de Cooperation Sacerdotal Hispano-Americana* founded in Madrid in 1948, and the other group established in Holland by that Episcopate, together with the approval granted April 22, 1950, by the Holy See to the *Societas Christi pro emigrantibus* for the spiritual care of the Poles.

35. *The renewal of spiritual assistance to emigrants of the Oriental Rite.* For the Orientals are mentioned: the establishment of the diocese of Cairo for the Maronites who went as refugees from Lebanon to Egypt, the creation of four Ruthenian exarchates in Canada and of an Oriental Ordinariate in Brazil.

The review closes by recalling the establishment of the Lithuanian College of St. Casimir in Rome for clerics and priests who are refugees from that nation and the proclamation of St. Francis of Paul as Patron of the Italian Societies of Navigators and that of St. Frances Xavier Cabrini as heavenly Patron of all emigrants.

36. The first title ends with an apologetic touch, as if to justify the historical review: "This appeared necessary in our times in which the provident work of the Church is falsely impugned, misunderstood and contested on that very terrain of charity where it first broke the ground and which not rarely it has been left alone to cultivate."

GIUSEPPE FERRETTO
Assessor of the
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OUR LADY OF LOURDES AND THE MARIAN YEAR

In his glorious Encyclical *Fulgens corona,* proclaiming the present year as the Year of Mary, Pope Pius XII definitely links the apparitions of Our Lady to St. Bernadette, which occurred at Lourdes, France, in 1858, to the solemn definition of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception by Pope Pius IX in 1854. After speaking of the joy with which the Catholic world received this solemn pronouncement and the increase of devotion and of virtue which followed it, the Holy Father asserts:

> Moreover, it seems that the Blessed Virgin Mary herself wished to confirm by some special sign the definition which the Vicar of her Divine Son on earth had pronounced amid the applause of the whole Church. For indeed, four years had not yet elapsed when, in a French town at the foot of the Pyrenees, the Virgin Mother, youthful and benign in appearance, clothed in a shining white garment, covered with a white mantle and girded with a hanging blue cord, showed herself to a simple and innocent girl at the grotto of Massabielle. And to this same girl, earnestly inquiring the name of her with whose vision she was favored, with eyes raised to heaven and sweetly smiling, she replied: "I am the Immaculate Conception."

It would be an interesting historical study to investigate the number of occasions on which the Sovereign Pontiffs in official pronouncements have recognized as genuine such events as miraculous apparitions and supernatural revelations which have occurred since the deposit of public revelation was closed. The Breviary does, indeed, narrate many cases of saints who were favored by visions. Thus, we read in the Office of St. Margaret Mary of the apparitions and revelations which she received from the Sacred Heart; and in the Office of the Seven Founders of the Servite Order we are told that they were privileged to behold the Mother of God. However, the only feast of the universal Church having an apparition of Our Lady as its main object is the feast celebrated on February 11, "In Apparitione B. Mariae Virginis Immaculatae." This feast, previously celebrated in certain places, was extended to the entire Church by Blessed Pope Pius X in 1907. But now, in a papal Encyclical, we have the assertion of Pope Pius XII that Mary did appear to little Bernadette in the grotto of Massabielle almost a century ago.

Does it follow that we are now bound to believe as an unquestionable fact that the Mother of God actually did appear to St. Bernadette? The answer must be sought in two accepted theological principles, one concerning the significance of a papal statement on miraculous facts or supernatural communications (outside of the content of public revelation), the other concerning the authoritative value of statements in such documents as Encyclical Letters.

The general norm concerning the significance of papal approval of such supernatural incidents as visions, miracles, etc., is well explained by one who was an outstanding canonist and a great Pope, Prospero Lambertini, Pope Benedict XIV. In his monumental treatise on the beatification and canonization of saints, this distinguished scholar asserts that the statements of the Church declaring that certain miracles or apparitions have taken place mean that these occurrences are probable and piously worthy of credence (*probabiles et pie credibiles*) but do not impose on the faithful the obligation to accept them as having *certainly* occurred.[1] In the words of Cardinal Franzelin: "The judgment of the Church is not directed to proposing [private] revelations to the faithful to be believed with divine faith, but to declaring that: a. There is nothing in them which is opposed to Catholic faith, good morals and Christian discipline; b. There are sufficient evidences of truth so that such revelations can be piously and prudently and without superstition believed with human faith by Catholics and can be read for their edification. After this approbation of the Church, or even if no [ecclesiastical] judgment has been passed but there are grave reasons for their genuineness, it is certainly not lawful to despise such revelations."[2]

However, the other principle is that statements contained in such papal proclamations as Encyclical Letters must be accepted with unhesitating internal assent. This has long been the teaching of approved theologians, and recently it was confirmed by Pope Pius XII in *Humani generis*.[3] The nature of the assent would vary in accordance with the type of doctrine propounded and the

[1] *De beatificatione et canonizatione sanctorum,* Lib. II, *cap.* 32, n. 11; Lib. III, *cap.* 53, n. 15.

[2] *De divina traditione et scriptura,* 3rd ed. (Rome, 1882), p. 277.

[3] *AAS,* XLII (1950), 568.

manner in which the Sovereign Pontiff speaks. There is no reason why the Pope should not employ an Encyclical to proclaim a doctrine of divine-Catholic faith. Or, the statement in question may be a truth which already has been solemnly declared a doctrine of divine-Catholic faith or is being taught as such by the universal and ordinary magisterium.[4] But, even when the prerogative of infallibility does not corroborate the papal teaching, the statement must be accepted with *religious assent*—that is, with a judgment endowed with practical certitude (without any *probability* that the opposite is true), despite the remote *possibility* that the doctrine is erroneous. As Msgr. Fenton expresses it: "The 'religious assent' of which the theologians speak is due to the individual doctrinal pronouncements of the various Roman Congregations. It is due on manifestly stronger grounds to the individual doctrinal pronouncements not presented as infallible teachings but set forth in papal encyclicals."[5]

By uniting these two principles we conclude that Catholics are bound to believe with religious assent that it is *probable and piously worthy of credence* that Mary appeared to Bernadette Soubirous at Lourdes. If one denied this minimum of assent to the apparitions he would be guilty of grave sin in the obedience he owes to the Vicar of Jesus Christ, but he would not sin if he abstained from accepting the apparitions as *certain* occurrences. Applicable to this situation are the words of Dr. E. Benard: "We assent unconditionally, with no fear of error, to the fact that the opinion the Pope sets forth is well founded and safe."[6]

However, it is difficult to see how anyone who admits the possibility of miracles—which we are bound to believe with divine-Catholic faith[7]—can reasonably doubt that the Mother of God appeared to St. Bernadette and that many genuine miracles have been wrought there for the benefit of those who came thither to

[4] *Can.* 1323, § 1.

[5] Cf. "The Doctrinal Authority of Papal Encyclicals," *AER,* CXXI, 2 (August, 1949), 148.

[6] Cf. "The Doctrinal Value of the Ordinary Teaching of the Holy Father" in *Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America* (New York, 1951), p. 98.

[7] *DB,* 1813.

seek Mary's intercession and to adore her Divine Son.[8] From the very first day when Bernadette narrated what she had seen at the grotto, Lourdes has been a sign of contradiction. The child who claimed that a "beautiful lady" had appeared to her was denounced as a liar or an idiot. Yet, this unlettered girl of fourteen never fell into any inconsistency in her numerous examinations, and never failed to give an adequate reply to the objections brought against the genuineness and the miraculous character of the extraordinary cures at Lourdes. These were based on claims that there is some marvelous chemical ingredient in the water of the spring, that the cures are due to natural "faith healing," etc., but reliable medical testimony, confirmed by the detailed and conscientious investigation of a great number of cases, is sufficient to establish the fact that the wonders of Lourdes can be produced only by a power above all created agents.[9] There are, indeed, some who admit the genuineness of the cures, and grant that they cannot be explained by any *known* natural powers, but still have recourse to the pathetic argument of *"unknown* laws," like Alexis Carrel, who wrote a moving account of his journey to Lourdes in 1903.[10] But this theory is fraught with immeasurably greater intellectual difficulties than the admission of these facts as genuine miracles. For some of the wonders of Lourdes are definitely exceptions to known laws of science. Besides, if unknown natural factors are the cause of these cures, why are they confined to such particular spots as Lourdes? And why do they operate only in connection with prayer and religious worship under the authorization of the Catholic Church?

Catholics should remember that the chief miracles of Lourdes are not those that consist in bodily healing, but rather those that indicate an extraordinary outpouring of divine grace. This shows itself particularly in the heroic fortitude manifested by those persons who come to the grotto, afflicted with some grave ailment which they hope may be cured, but must return to their homes unhealed. It is found as a general rule that such persons experi-

[8] It is well to note that many, if not most, of the miracles wrought at Lourdes take place in connection with the procession of the Blessed Sacrament rather than at the Grotto.

[9] Cf. Lebec, *Raisons médicales de croire* (Paris, 1949).

[10] Cf. A. Carrel, *The Voyage to Lourdes* (New York, 1950).

ence at Lourdes a consolation of soul which inspires them to accept with full conformity to God's will the pain and the suffering that may be their lot. This is the "miracle of courage" as it was recently called by a priest who had accompanied a pilgrimage of invalids to the great shrines of Europe and returned without being able to report a single physical miracle.[11]

One of the points of theological discussion connected with the vision seen by St. Bernadette is the particular nature of the apparition of Our Lady. It could have been the actual, physical body of Mary that left heaven and stood in the grotto of Massabielle. The fact that the bystanders did not see Mary would be no objection to this theory, since, according to St. Thomas, a person possessing a glorified body can render it invisible at will.[12] On the other hand, what Bernadette actually saw may have been only a miraculously produced vision of Mary, either extrinsic to Bernadette herself or impressed on her faculties. In these last two theories, it would not have been literally true that Mary came down from heaven and appeared in the grotto; but inasmuch as it would have been a miraculous intervention producing on Bernadette the same effects that would have been produced by the sight of the real body of Our Lady, we can correctly speak of it as an apparition of the Mother of God. In any theory, the communication made to Bernadette on this occasion, even though it was imparted only through a subjective impression on her faculties, was truly a message from the Mother of God, having all the effects of Mary's living voice.[13]

Beyond doubt there will be more pilgrims to Lourdes in the course of Mary's Year than generally come. Perhaps the number of miraculous physical favors that will be granted will be more than usual, perhaps it will be less. But in any event, the number of "miracles of courage" will be innumerable.

Our Lady of Lourdes should be very dear to the Catholics of the United States. For the patroness of our land is the Blessed Virgin under the title of the Immaculate Conception, and it was this title that Mary applied to herself when Bernadette asked the name of the heavenly visitor. "I am the Immaculate Conception," was the reply. We can hope with great confidence that the Marian

[11] NCWC news release, Dec. 7, 1953.
[12] *Supplementum*, Q. 85, a. 3.
[13] Cf. Van Noort, *De sacramentis* (Hilvershum, Holland, 1927), I, n. 380.

Year will bring to Americans, both those who have the opportunity to visit the shrine in the Pyrenees and those who will remain at home, many precious blessings. Let us hope especially that she will bring us peace.

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FIFTY YEARS AGO

The leading article in *The American Ecclesiastical Review* for February, 1904, is the *Motu proprio* of Blessed Pius X on church music, issued Nov. 22, 1903. (It would be useful for all choir directors and others having the supervision of church music to read this detailed directive occasionally). . . . An article by Fr. F. P. Siegfried, of Overbrook Seminary, on the recently published *Lex orandi* of Fr. Tyrrel is significant of the trend of thought among many Catholic scholars. High praisé is given to this work, despite its pronounced tendency toward subjectivism in religious belief, later condemned as an element of Modernism. However, a review of this work in the same issue criticizes Fr. Tyrrel's habit of minimizing "intellectual apologetic." . . . "The Small Family and National Decadence," by Fr. John A. Ryan, notes President Theodore Roosevelt's remarks on "race suicide," and deplores the population decline, not only because of the immorality it connotes but also because the small family spells enervating self-indulgence. It is interesting to read Father Ryan's prophetic statement: "All the signs point to a time not remotely distant when—if Catholics remain true to their consciences and their traditions—mere preponderating numbers will enable them to dominate American life." . . . The article "In Father Martin's Library," by Fr. A. Waldron, presents a code of instructions on doctrinal and moral matters for the benefit of Catholic doctors. . . . In the *Studies* a reply to a questioner asserts that even one who has been baptized in a non-Catholic denomination may use the Pauline privilege, provided the other conditions are realized. . . . An anonymous article informs the readers that several of the works of the Abbé Loisy have been put on the Index, and an announcement in the *Analecta* names several other writers whose books have suffered the same fate. Thus, the campaign of Blessed Pius X against Modernism was under way.

F. J. C.

THE PROBLEM OF KONNERSREUTH

(1) In *The American Ecclesiastical Review* (June, 1953, pp. 401-420; July, 1953, pp. 38-57) there appeared an article on the phenomena of Konnersreuth by Fr. James H. Van der Veldt, O.F.M., under the title "An Evaluation of the Konnersreuth Controversy." The author surveys in it "the present stand of the Konnersreuth problem by submitting a critical evaluation" (*ibid.*, p. 403) of "the most recently published works" (*ibid.*, p. 401) on the Konnersreuth controversy.

Among these works is included my book *Une stigmatisée de nos jours—Étude de psychologie religieuse* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1950). I feel obliged first to express my gratitude to Fr. Van der Veldt for the compliments given to my study in which he sees a "highly scientific and scholarly book" (*ibid.*, p. 408). But he also pointed out some ideas contained in it which he could hardly or not at all approve. They concern my explanation of the stigmata of Theresa Neumann, her visions and fasting. Considering the high authority which this distinguished scholar enjoys, I thought that it would be good to reply to his remarks and suggestions. But I shall do this as briefly as possible. The reader will find a more adequate explanation of the controversial points in my book *The Riddle of Konnersreuth* which is now being printed.

(2) To begin with, I think it very important to note that I did not mean to present in my study a complete theory on stigmatization, applicable to any particular case. I think that Fr. H. Thurston, S.J., was quite right, when, at the beginning of his study on stigmata, he said: "There is nothing perhaps which is more remarkable in this inquiry than the extreme diversity of the manifestations capable of being grouped under the general head of stigmatization. No two cases are precisely alike. Each needs to be examined by itself and to be judged upon its own merits."[1] Of course, when explaining the stigmata of Theresa Neumann, I stated different principles which can, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied

[1] H. Thurston, S.J., *The physical phenomena of mysticism* (London: Burns Oates; Chicago: H. Regnery, 1952), p. 57.

to any case of stigmatization known in history. But only *mutatis mutandis.*

(3) Let us pass to the particular remarks made by Father Van der Veldt. He finds one of my assertions "incorrect, logically speaking" (*ibid.*, p. 410). He sums it up as follows: "The first appearance of stigmata occurs always *during* an ecstatic state. Consequently stigmata are always the effect *(conséquence)* of an ecstasy or, at least, an ecstatic state is a *conditio sine qua non* of them" (*ibid.*, p. 409). The writer says he found this assertion on page 99 of my book. Now, this assertion, he continues, "is incorrect, logically speaking, because concomitance or co-incidence of phenomena does not establish a cause-effect nexus" (*ibid.*, p. 410).

Here is my reply. My whole argumentation here moves on historical ground: History does not know any case of genuine stigmatization [2] that appeared independently of the ecstatic state ("*indépendamment d'un état d'extase*"). All scholars agree on this point. Some go so far as to say: "Ecstasy forms the touchstone of stigmatization. Only that stigmatization is genuine that is born in ecstasy and is nourished by it; whose wounds open while in an ecstatic state. . . . The stigmatic wounds are explained by and through the ecstasy."[3] "Stigmata that are not born of it [ecstasy] are to be looked upon as suspect."[4] When I say: "Les stigmates viennent de l'extase" (p. 99), I do not mean at all to affirm on this point of the discussion, that "stigmata are the effect of an ecstasy. . . ." I only express in a brief formula the historical fact mentioned before. And the word "*conséquence*" (effect) which my distinguished critic quotes in parenthesis, when reproducing the argument which he found on page 99 of my book, does not appear on that page at all!

Moreover, let us note that it is not by this "reason" alone that I try, in my book, to demonstrate my theory "positively" ("*raisons positives*"). I quote other "reasons" (pp. 99-109).[5] Furthermore (and this should be emphasized), I do not assert that any of these reasons, considered in itself, proves MY THEORY incontestably.

[2] By "genuine stigmatization" I mean the stigmata which were not fabricated by the individual himself.

[3] J Teodorowicz, *Mystical phenomena in the life of Theresa Neumann* (St. Louis: B Herder, 1947), p. 304.

[4] J. Teodorowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

[5] Some of them are presented under the form of solution of the objections.

They are to be taken together. They constitute a kind of *argumentum ex convergentia.* And even so, they are far from giving me an absolute certainty. They give me only a probability but a substantial one. The words with which I closed the chapter on stigmatization are most instructive on this point. "The final conclusion to our study, then, must be: There are no convincing reasons to hold that stigmatization, *considered in itself,* surpasses necessarily all the powers of nature, that it requires a special intervention of God, that it is strictly miraculous" (p. 108).

(4) Let us now consider the second remark made by Father Van der Veldt about my study on Konnersreuth. My book—he says—"declares that ecstasy in itself as a psychic reality, regardless of the cause, is not a supernatural phenomenon but the consequence of weakness native to human nature" (p. 410). Now "authoritative theologians support this statement, but understand human frailty in a sense that is quite different from that inferred by the author" (*ibid.*). Indeed, ecstasy "is a weakness inherent in our very human make-up as the theologians whom Father Siwek himself mentions emphatically point out" (*ibid.*). Ecstasies are not "entirely due to individual differences," that is to say, they are not "symptomatic of an individually weak or perhaps even morbid constitution" *(ibid.).*

What shall I say? May I point out that there is no disagreement between the theologians mentioned in my book and myself. On pages 114-15 I not only quote some theologians but I *defend* their opinion as my own. Ecstasy, I say with them, "is a kind of weakness, an imperfection of human nature, which is incapable of supporting the divine invasion: mystical contemplation or vision" (*ibid.,* pp. 114-15). "This imperfection of our nature does not appear to be morbid" (*ibid.,* p. 115).

But let us consider more closely the argument by which Father Van der Veldt tries to demonstrate my disagreement with the "authoritative theologians" on the problem of ecstasy. "In order to confirm the statement that ecstasies result from the debility in human nature," he says, "the author singles out some saints who experienced ecstasies at a very early age—even the age of five and six years; on the other hand, those saints whom Father Siwek considers to have had a more robust psychophysiological constitution failed to produce any such phenomenon" (*ibid.,* p. 410).

In this assertion there are several inaccurate statements. Let us point out some of them. *First*, the fact that some people "experienced ecstasies at a very early age," e.g. Pastida of Siena almost from the cradle, Mary Frances of the Five Wounds when she was four years old, St. Catherine of Siena at the age of five, was not mentioned in order to "confirm the statement that ecstasies result from the debility in human nature," but only in order to show that the notion of ecstasy which I developed before does not contradict ("*concorde bien*") the facts which the history of the Church relates (p. 115). *Second*, the facts alluded to are taken by me not only from the lives of "some saints," but also from the lives of other people. I mentioned several of them. *Third*, my distinguished critic omitted two most important facts that I quoted: (a) "Ecstasy is to be found generally only in the persons who have not arrived at the summit of the mystical life"; (b) "According to Catholic theologians, our Lord and the Blessed Virgin never experienced ecstasy" (p. 115). Now these two facts clearly show, I think, that ecstasy is really "symptomatic" of a particular weakness, congenital or even morbid, of individuals. Indeed, if ecstasy, as Father Van der Veldt emphatically asserts, "is inherent in our very human make-up," we do not understand very well why Our Lord, the Blessed Virgin and the individuals alluded to just now could enjoy the mystical life (even in its highest degree!) without any ecstasy. They had certainly a "very human make-up"!

The particular weakness which ecstasy implies admits in my opinion many degrees. However, in my book I considered with special attention the weakness which is frankly "morbid." For I am discussing the ecstasies of Theresa Neumann which seem really to have a morbid origin, at least, if we consider them in the light of the criteria which Benedict XIV emphasized in his monumental book *De servorum Dei beatificatione et sanctorum canonizatione.*

Father Van der Veldt says that according to my theories Saint Catherine of Siena (who experienced ecstasies from her fifth year of age!) "would be categorized as among the 'weak' saints in spite of the fact that she showed a remarkable strength of character in persuading Pope Gregory XI to return from Avignon to Rome" (*ibid.*, p. 411). Father Van der Veldt seems to confuse two kinds of weakness. The weakness of which I am speaking in my book has nothing to do with "weakness of character." I mean to speak

of a particular weakness of the organism, or better, of the nervous system. And its principal manifestation is what we call in psychology "emotional constitution" (congenital or traumatic). This kind of weakness is perfectly compatible with a strong will, with a robust character.

(5) Father Van der Veldt affirms that in "the problems of relationship between stigmatization and hysteria" I go "one step beyond" Father Thurston. Here is his proof. According to Father Thurston "an hysterical constitution forms the '*atmosphere*' for the causation of stigmata," whereas I am said to maintain "that hysteria is a necessary condition for stigmatization" (*ibid.*, p. 412). This proof originated in an inaccurate interpretation of the following passage of my book: "Il [Father Thurston] note que l'hystérie, sans faire partie intégrante des stigmates, constitue leur *atmosphère*; nous dirions leur condition nécessaire" (p. 101). Father Van der Veldt took the last words in this text for my own affirmation, and opposed it to that of Father Thurston. In reality, I intended to explain more clearly the vague term "*atmosphère*" used by Father Thurston. My own opinion on the point in question is expressed a little further: "Why is a neurotic state (*la névrose*) necessary in the etiology of stigmata, if really God produces them *miraculously*" (*ibid.*). I am far from thinking that hysteria is indispensable for stigmatization; I mean hysteria properly called ("to which I alluded," in my study, on pages 130-31; 158-60). For I have no objection to the term "the phenomenological hysteria in the stricter sense,"[6] of which Father Van der Veldt speaks in his article (pp. 413-14), and which means only a particular kind of "psychosomatic reactivity" to different stimuli. This "hysteria," as Father Van der Veldt notes, "does not automatically exclude personal holiness" (*ibid.*, p. 414).

Of course, God can produce stigmata independently of any

[6] In the widest sense of the word, hysteria means "suggestibility." This terminology is for Father Van der Veldt "almost a misnomer" (*ibid.*, p. 413). For me, it is an illegimate *abusus verborum*. But I think that the second type of hysteria, "the general disposition to neurotic reactions" (*ibid.*), is not quite free from this reproach, or it coincides, at least practically, with the third type of hysteria which he calls "the phenomenological hysteria in the stricter sense." It is for this reason that "the neurotic state" of which I speak in relation to stigmata covers also a large part of the second type of "phenomenological hysteria."

natural cause. Nor does my book question this possibility. My problem, as I noted before, moves on historical ground: all stigmatized people (the saints constitute only a very small portion of them!), whose life we happen to know better, had a particular emotional constitution, which we can call with Father Van der Veldt "the phenomenological hysteria in the stricter sense."

(6) As to Theresa Neumann, I have no doubt that many symptoms of her illnesses (starting from the day of the memorable fire in 1918) possessed a definitely hysterical pattern. I have in mind violent spasms, convulsions, hyperesthesias, anesthesias, contorsions, paralyses, and so forth. I described them carefully in my book.

The same opinion was clearly stated already in the medical report of February, 1920. Many eminent Catholic physicians, e.g. J. Deutsch, H. Heermann, P. Mansion, J. Lhermitte, Martini, Poray-Madeyski, and so on, agree emphatically with us. Even some enthusiastic friends of Konnersreuth seem to accept our opinion, but they generally hasten to add that "all these hysterical appearances were only in passing."[7]

We shall see later if Theresa's hysterical symptoms do not persist any longer. On this point of our discussion let us note only that the admission of Theresa's hysteria in the period of her life preceding her visions places the Catholic scholar before a very important problem which he must honestly answer. Indeed, before we admit someone's supernatural visions we must investigate carefully (*sedulo examinandum est*), says Benedict XIV, whether his visions "were not *preceded* by some natural cause which might have produced them. In fact, persons suffering from some physical or mental illness, as well as those who are disturbed by their thoughts and emotions, easily believe that they see things which are not really there."[8] Many visions, notes St. Theresa, have their origin in "melancholia,"[9] by which word she designates a variety of mental disturbances which were not very well understood in her time.

[7] J. Teodorowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

[8] *Op. cit.*, lib. III, cap. 51, n. 1.

[9] *The Interior Castle*, Sixth Mansion, ch. III, n. 2 (See *Life*, ch. XXIII, n. 14).

Now hysteria belongs certainly to "the natural causes" in which the "visions" can easily originate. This is generally known. And the Catholic scholar who studies the case of Theresa Neumann in the light of the principles of the Doctors *quorum laus est in Ecclesia* cannot elude the following problem: Are not perhaps Theresa's visions manifestations of her hysterical condition? Are they not perhaps *different symptoms of the same illness* from which she suffered before her visions occurred? It is common knowledge that external manifestations of hysteria can change frequently (*"On sait avec quelle facilité les manifestations extérieures de l'hystérie changent de forme,"* p. 132).

It is in this connection that I asked myself in my book if Theresa's visions are not perhaps a kind of "substitution" (*ibid.*) of her ancient paralyses, spasms, convulsions, etc. I asked: "Have we already proved *with evidence that Theresa is completely cured* [from her hysteria], and that the marvelous phenomena which followed these seizures are not a mere substitution?" (p. 132). This is a question which, according to the principles of Benedict XIV, is to be solved by those who defend the supernatural character of Theresa's visions. Unfortunately, this question was never solved by them.

And now let us see how Father Van der Veldt presents my argumentation. "In order to prove," he says, "that Therese still suffers hysteria, Father Siwek presents the following observations (p. 132). Noting that during the year 1926, when Theresa was recovering from her ailments, she gradually became stigmatized, he suggests that substitution had taken place. Whereas prior to 1926 Therese manifested her hysterical condition in such seizures as paralyses, spasms, and convulsions, she later revealed her hysterical condition by another type of external manifestations such as visions, ecstasies and stigmata, for 'on sait avec quelle facilité les manifestations extérieures de l'hystérie changent de forme.' Is this not begging the question? It may well be that at one time paralyses and the like were a sign of hysteria, whereas we now ascertain visions, stigmata and such phenomena. If we conclude that these phenomena are also signs of hysteria, we seem to presuppose that the woman is still hysterical—which was to be proven" (*ibid.*, p. 418).

What Father Van der Veldt attributes here to me I have never

written or thought of. But he commits still another mistake. In order to show that even the material manifestations of hysteria (convulsions, spasms, and so on) did not entirely disappear in Theresa after her stigmatization in 1926, I quoted the following fact: "The nuns who observed Theresa Neumann in 1927 (!) noted that she suffered a nervous spell which lasted twelve minutes during the night of July 17-18. In a condition of semi-consciousness she cried out that she was being stabbed in the heart. The account of this attack is conclusive evidence for Dr. H. Heermann that it was hysterical" (p. 131). Now this fact which is the most important in my argumentation was simply omitted by Father Van der Veldt!

Father Van der Veldt tries to defend Theresa Neumann by the distinction between characterological and phenomenological hysteria, a distinction which he took from Niedermeyer (pp. 412-14). This distinction, however, I cannot approve. Hysteria, properly called, is both characterological and phenomenological. But it admits many degrees in gravity, and numerous manifestations in quality; one of the characteristics of hysterical phenomena is their extreme mutability. The symptoms of a "hysterical character" as they are presented by Father Van der Veldt (*ibid.*) correspond to one particular form of hysteria. They certainly do not cover all cases of hysterical character. Not all hysterical characters are incompatible with great power of will or a high sanctity. I alluded to this point on pages 130-131.

Gerlich tries to weaken the diagnosis of Dr. Heermann by asserting that the attack was occasioned by the nuns themselves. Such an explanation is valueless, because hysterical seizures are often occasioned by some external stimuli. The fact that at present we do not hear of any actual seizure of Theresa constitutes a purely "negative argument," which is always subject to caution, as Logic teaches us. But whatever one may think of this particular problem, the psychological and theological analysis of Theresa's visions and ecstasies convinced me that she was never perfectly cured of her ailments. Shall we call them "hysterical" or "neurotic"? This is a question of little importance, for, as is commonly known, the definition of hysteria is still controversial. Personally I prefer the term "neurotic."

(7) In order to explain the bleeding of Theresa Neumann during her Friday ecstasies I advanced as early as 1931[10] the possibility of vicarious menstruation. Among the reasons for this hypothesis I pointed out that only two of the hundreds of known stigmatics were men; all the others were women (p. 91). Father Van der Veldt says that this possibility "cannot be denied" (*ibid.* [July 1953], p. 43). But he seems to think that it was expressed by me in too absolute a manner. Father Van der Veldt seems not to have read the footnote which I added to the passage in question. Here it is: "Schroeder, in his study on complementary menstruation, says that it is impossible to attribute every periodical bleeding to menstruation, for such takes place in males also."[11] I do not maintain at all that every instance of periodical bleeding emanates from the vicarious menstruation! The bleeding in stigmatized persons can be explained sometimes by vicarious menstruation, and in some cases by other circulatory disorders which are to be carefully examined in any *particular* instance.

(8) Are the visions of Theresa Neumann of divine origin or are they the product of natural forces? In order to solve this problem I discussed different arguments or "criteria" which are given by the defenders of Konnersreuth in favor of the former alternative. And I saw clearly that no one contradicts the criticism. Theresa's visions considered from the scientific (psychological) point of view contain nothing that indicates a supernatural intervention of God. They can all be very easily explained by natural forces. And I concluded the chapter on Theresa's visions as follows: "Some writers, seeing the difficulty of the problem admit that there is only one criterion of the supernatural character of Theresa's visions, and that is their *spiritual fruit*. Her visions must be from God, they say, because they increase the love of God in her soul. Within limits, this is an excellent criterion, but it shows only that the visions are not of diabolic origin, that they must in some manner come from God. We do not know *in what manner*. The hallucinatory character of certain visions does not impugn their moral usefulness and their providential intention,

[10] *Konnersreuth . . .* (Krakow: Jezuici, 1931), pp. 92-93; 168-69.

[11] Carl Schroeder, *Handbuch der Krankheiten der weiblichen Geschlechtsorgane*, XII Aufl. (Leipzig, 1898), p. 124.

notes Father Maréchal.[12] In this restricted sense, we too can admit that they come 'from God' " (p. 13).

But in this restricted sense there is nothing in the world that cannot be called "supernatural." *Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum.* Yes. Everything—poverty and wealth, sickness and health, disgrace and honor, failure and success. But when we inquire whether a vision be "supernatural," is *this* the meaning we have in mind?

Father Van der Veldt obviously did not reach accurately the meaning of this passage. It appears clearly from his following words: "He [Siwek] admits that this criterion would prove that the visions derive indeed from God, and not from the devil, but he argues that it fails to note the manner in which they derive from God. Here we meet an illustration of how the author seems to retrace his steps in the course of his argumentation. Actually we are no longer concerned with the *modus quo,* but with the cause. If—as the author admits—the visions of Theresa Neumann derive from God, they are supernatural *quoad causam,* and that is what we are called upon to prove at this juncture" (*ibid.* [July 1953], pp. 39-40). No! We *are* concerned with the *modus quo* at this juncture! As long as we do not solve *this* problem, we know only that Theresa's visions are not the effect of the diabolic forces; that, consequently, they "come from God." But whether they come from Him as any other *natural* event, e.g. poverty or wealth (*per concursum generalem, naturalem*) or as a particular favor or grace (*per concursum specialem, supernaturalem*), nothing is said by him who says that they "derive from God"!

(9) "What can be determined as regards the fasting in the case of Therese Neumann? . . . Father Siwek gives answer by stating Therese does not eat, only because she cannot eat. He would account for her condition as having its origin in an illness which makes it physically impossible for her to take food. But it is of little importance whether the woman can or cannot eat inasmuch as people who laboring under ailments cannot eat, be they hysterical or otherwise, eventually succumb" (*ibid.* [July 1953], p. 51).

I regret that my ideas were not reproduced correctly. In the passage which Father Van der Veldt sketched above I am merely

[12] J. Maréchal, S.I., *Etudes sur la psychologie des mystiques,* T. I (Paris: Alcan), pp. 210-11.

describing the method which Benedict XIV advised us to follow in the examination of a supernatural fasting. "First of all," he says, "we must make careful inquiry in the fact itself to discover whether the person in question really abstained from eating and drinking during the *whole* time. This inquiry demands extreme severity (*admodum severos*). Once the fact of a long fast has been established, we must find out whether the fasting began with some illness (*an jejunium a morbo incoeperit*). For 'not only physicians but theologians as well admit long natural fasts in sick persons.' If the fasting did not begin with an illness, we must next examine whether the person felt well during his period of fasting" (p. 161).

Having thus related the method of Benedict XIV, I concluded: "If we were to follow Pope Benedict's *method* rigorously, we would have to rule out a supernatural origin of Theresa's fast immediately. For her fasting *did commence with an illness, with a natural impossibility of eating*" (p. 161). However, I said, "we cannot accept" this *theory* any longer (p. 164). And I reviewed other theories on the subject. The most plausible one appeared to me "the theory of unconscious fraud" (p. 164) which I already presented in my first publication on Konnersreuth (1931). But I am taking "unconscious fraud" not exclusively in a psychological meaning, but also, and even principally, in a moral one. Theresa Neumann, for different reasons (e.g. the edification and conversion of souls, the glory of Christ, and so on) can sincerely believe that there is no moral fault in affirming that she takes no food, although she eats a little, very little . . . almost nothing!

(10) Before I conclude this article let me say one word on the stigmata of St. Francis of Assisi. Can one who follows my theories of stigmatization admit their supernatural character? Certainly. Being a natural effect of ecstasy, they were by the same token the effect of his mystical love (and vision) which was the cause of the ecstasy. Now his love (and vision) seems to have been supernatural. For the same reason his stigmata were supernatural (not "miraculous"!).

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REPLY TO FATHER SIWEK

The title "The Problem of Konnersreuth" in which Fr. Paul Siwek, S. J., has found it necessary to take exception to my articles on Konnersreuth (*AER,* CXXVIII, 6 [June 1953], 401-20; CXXIX, 1 [July 1953], 38-57) seems somewhat misleading because it is too broad. It should be designated more accurately a criticism of my articles. And since the latter were an evaluation, it correspondingly has the nature of a criticism of an evaluation. The present reply thereby becomes an evaluation to the third power—sufficient indication that we come dangerously close to a *series in infinitum,* so characteristic of the Konnersreuth controversy.

Father Siwek presents his answer in no less than ten points. Practically every time I happened to mention his name, the author sees red. Despite all this disagreement, however, he could not have failed to notice that I agree with him in several essential points of what he calls his theories. The fact that these theories are not as original as he purports them to be does not take anything from their value. That I should have expressed agreement as far as essentials go, and allowing that Father Siwek's book does not give the impression of "defending" Therese Neumann, it is rather surprising to find the author charging me with a defense of the Konnersreuth woman in point six of his article. Ironically enough, most readers of my articles felt that I did not defend Therese Neumann, as may be gathered from the reviews and letters received. Both parties are probably correct. I did not defend Therese Neumann in the sense that I consider her experiences as undoubtedly supernatural. But I did defend her—if we may use the term—from "certain methods of attack and a number of arguments." This I clearly stated in the introduction to my article (p. 403). One can very well subscribe to a thesis without admitting all the arguments.

In replying to the criticism of Fr. Siwek point for point, I shall limit quotation to the absolutely necessary and thus spare the reader as much as possible from tediousness.

(1) The first point conveys an exchange of compliments. I reciprocate these compliments of my reverend critic by again acknowledging that I consider his book a very valuable contribution

to the Konnersreuth problem. But does that make it infallible? And I beg to add another question. Why did Father Siwek, apropos of the scope of my article, take quotations from two different pages (pp. 403, 401) and thereby convey a wrong impression as to the intention I had in mind? It was all there in a single paragraph of the first of these pages, clearly announcing that I did not intend to review or survey any work on Konnersreuth but only evaluate a number of arguments as found in the respective books, and not only that of Father Siwek.

(2) I do not think that I ever criticized, attacked, questioned, or in any way minimized the obvious wisdom of the statement made in reference to presentation of a theory of stigmatization. It is common knowledge that no two case histories are ever alike. There is nothing remarkable about this fact, as Father Siwek's authority thinks, and every doctor or psychiatrist will tell us. But if a theory, designed to explain a number of such cases, has any value, it must cover the main characteristics or symptoms.

(3) A statement like this: the first appearance of stigmata occurs always during an ecstatic state, is evidently—if it is to have any meaning—an assertion based on historical fact. My distinguished opponent need not bolster such an assertion with quotations from other authors, because I do not quarrel with it. But I do object to his jumping from this historical fact to a conclusion that stigmata derive from ecstasy, that ecstasy is the *conditio sine qua non* of stigmata. Because in so doing, the argumentation no longer "moves on historical ground" but enters the field of logic. This was the transition I criticized. If other authors proceed the same way, they commit the same error. Father Siwek announces with an exclamation mark—he uses them rather generously—that the term *conséquence* is not to be found on page ninety-nine of his book. True, but my footnote naturally did not refer to that one word, but to the gist of his argument which indeed is found on the page indicated. As to this controversial word, *conséquence,* I solemnly declare that the author did not use it on page ninety-nine, but he did use it on page 103 and again on page 109 where he arrives at the final conclusion.

The above-mentioned final conclusion is presented after the author has offered other "positive reasons," but they all follow the same pattern. I do not contest that stigmata are, or may be,

the result or effect of an emotional condition as found in the ecstasy, but I questioned Father Siwek's proof. And I am happy to note that the author now admits that his "positive reasons," even when taken together, "are far from giving me an absolute certainty." That is all I tried to point out.

(4) The problem stated in this fourth point concerns whether ecstasy, considered as a psychic reality, is a natural phenomenon. I do not deny that it is or may be; that is irrelevant for the purpose at hand, since again, I was only interested in the evidence as presented by Father Siwek.

One of his arguments is based on the authority of a number of theologians who are of the opinion that ecstasy in itself is a sign of weakness of human nature. I felt that Father Siwek's interpretation of this weakness, as presented in his book (pp. 114, 115), is different from that intended by the aforementioned theologians and upon a second reading of his article I am still more convinced of a notable disagreement. Ecstasy for my critic implies a "particular weakness"; "ecstasy is really symptomatic of a particular weakness, congenital or even morbid, of individuals." Compare these statements with those of the theologians to whom he refers; they do not speak of a *particular* frailty but consider ecstasy an "imperfection *proper* to our nature." We note in passing that Father Siwek omits the significant term "proper."

Here is what one of these theologians, Fr. A. Fonck, has to say. After limiting himself to the ecstasy which follows upon contemplation ("l'extase consécutive à la contemplation"), he asks if such an ecstasy is a morbid phenomenon and he answers in the words of Pacheu: "Au sens propre du mot, non, semble-t-il. C'est une opération *très normale,* qui peut survenir a un tempérament *physiologiquement très sain, très bien équilibré.* Il est vrai que c'est défectueux, c'est une certaine faiblesse, une imperfection de la nature humaine de ne pouvoir supporter ce choc, cet envahissement du divin. Mais cette *imperfection propre à notre nature* n'apparaît pas morbide. Il n'est pas morbide de fléchir les genoux et de plier sous le faix de cent kilos" (italics are mine).

In Father Siwek's opinion the weakness of which ecstasy is a sign is found only in those individuals who happen to possess a particular constitution, while according to Fonck and Pacheu, all human beings will show this weakness. This frailty of our human

nature certainly admits of degree. But the degrees are not only due to individual differences of those who experience the "ce choc, cet envahissement du divin," but also the strength of the "choc." For that reason, in my article I stated that ecstasies are not "entirely due to individual differences." In psychological language we might say that the response depends not only on the strength of the subject but also on the strength of the stimulus. A child will bend under the weight of one or two pounds, an adult may be able to stay a hundred pounds, and a prize-fighter could support even more, yet there is a limit to the endurance of a giant. In terms less metaphorical I remarked in my article: "The effect of mystical contemplation may be so overpowering that any human person, regardless of his or her psychological or physiological strength, is absolutely overwhelmed." However, there are two human beings to whom even the highest form of divine invasion *(envahissement)* could never come as a *choc:* Christ, the Son of God, and Our Lady who was full of grace. Christ and Mary are so privileged that, in this respect, every comparison with other human beings simply fails—even though both had "a very human make-up." Father Siwek put the last words in quotation marks (adding of course an exclamation point), apparently referring to my declaration: "ecstasy is a weakness inherent in our very human make-up." May I venture that the word "very" has two different connotations in English. In my sentence it is used as an adjective; Father Siwek would seem to recognize and apply only its adverbial usage.

Father Siwek accuses me of omitting "two most important facts" purported to show clearly "that ecstasy is really symptomatic of a particular weakness." My answer must reaffirm that I did not hold them to be so very important. If I had mentioned them, I would have found fault with the arguments also. One of them refers to the fact of Christ and the Blessed Virgin never having experienced ecstasy. On that I have already spoken enough. The other argument is that "ecstasy is to be found generally only in persons who have not arrived at the summit of the mystical life." To this I say that, in a concrete case, it will be difficult to indicate when the highest degree of mystical life had been reached. Who would assay the degree of mystical life reached by St. Francis of Assisi or St. Catherine of Siena at the time they were experiencing ecstasies?

We now touch upon another fact, namely, that some individuals had ecstasies at a very early age. Father Siwek notes that this was not mentioned to "confirm the statement that ecstasies result from the debility in human nature." Frankly speaking, here I am at a loss. My reverend critic did indeed give it mention, by way of contrast *(par contre)*, in his reference to Christ and the Blessed Virgin, which obviously was intended as one of his cardinal points in the entire argument. I invite the reader to compare the following propositions: "my notion of ecstasy agrees *(concorde bien)* with certain facts"; and "certain facts confirm my notion." The reader undoubtedly will feel that here we have a distinction without a difference. Splitting hairs may be a pastime, but most people find it rather tedious.

My honoured opponent takes issue with my singling out the saints among the young ecstatics he mentioned. The reason prompting this was the opportunity thereby given me to discuss the opposition which seems to exist in the mind of Father Siwek between "weak" and "robust" saints. If ecstasy implies a particular weakness, the saints who had ecstasies should be called "weak," be they young or old. Equally so, those who did not suffer ecstasies should be called "robust." In fact, Father Siwek, in his book (p. 99), mentions a number of saints to whom he ascribes a robust constitution. We therefore may ask him, in what does this robust constitution consist as against the weak constitution of others? The author replies (pp. 99, 100) that those saints possessed a psychologically robust constitution ("une constitution psychologique robuste"). One readily concludes then that the saints who due to their ecstasies displayed a particular weakness would supposedly possess a psychologically weak constitution. Since Father Siwek used the term "psychological," I was naturally led to believe that he included also strength of character. Hence when I referred to St. Catherine of Siena, I did not confuse "two kinds of weakness," but simply followed up Father Siwek's lead.

In his article Father Siwek has corrected his book. He now maintains that the weakness, of which ecstasy is said to be a sign, is "a particular weakness of the organism, or better, of the nervous system." Indeed, that sounds better. And yet, we venture to enquire, how does Father Siwek, or any nerve specialist for that matter, know that St. Dominic or St. Alphonsus had a more robust

nervous system than, for instance, St. Peter of Alcantara or St. Nicholas von der Flüe? Father Siwek answers in his article that the principal manifestation of a weak nervous system is an "emotional constitution (congenital or traumatic)." But again, how does Father Siwek know that Alcantara had an emotional constitution? Because he had ecstasies? If so, are we not turning in circles? Father Siwek's argumentation on the face of it looks very much like it; some saints suffered ecstasies because they had a particular weak nervous system, and we know their nervous system to be weak because they experienced ecstasies. All this could be avoided if we simply allow, as does Father Fonck, that ecstasy is a weakness *proper* to our human nature. If we depart from this idea, we are destined to fall into useless and endless ruminations about the physiological or psychophysiological constitution of our saints.

(5) It may well be that it was Father Siwek's intention to clarify Thurston's term "atmosphere" in the problem of the relationship between stigmatization and hysteria, though here the old adage applies "de internis non judicat praetor." Since he quotes Thurston with apparent endorsement and since "necessary condition" is a much stronger term than atmosphere, I believe I was fully justified in concluding that Father Siwek went a step beyond Thurston. This, however, need not mean that the two terms are opposed. If there is any question of inaccuracy on my part, it is that I should have said "two steps," inasmuch as Father Siwek has the additional statement that "a neurotic state *(la névrose)* is necessary in the etiology of stigmata." I feel sorry for the reader in bothering him with aimless wrangling of this kind, because in the long run, who cares whether Father Siwek goes one or twenty steps beyond Thurston? Had I foreseen that my innocent remark about that "step beyond" would make Father Siwek bristle, I surely would have omitted it.

Important, however, is Father Siwek's opinion, expressed in his book (p. 101), that stigmata are prepared by a neurotic and especially a hysterical condition ("pourquoi Dieu l'y préparerait-il par la névrose, et surtout par l'hystérie?"). I shall refer to this in the point following.

I suppose I should feel gratified that Father Siwek for once agrees with me; at least he has no objection against my speaking

of phenomenological hysteria. When I claim that there is a difference in degree between the second and third form of phenomenological hysteria, he feels that the two "coincide, at least practically." What he means by "practically" is anyone's guess. When I criticized the use of the term hysteria for mere suggestibility—as at times happens—and called such use a misnomer, Father Siwek, preferring to speak Latin, termed it "illegitimate *abusus verborum.*" He is perfectly welcome to this expression, even though I fail to see a great deal of difference between the two. But if pedantry is to be the order of the day, may I point out that the latter term is a pleonasm, since *abusus* is always illegitimate?

(6) The first paragraphs of this point on the hysterical pattern in Therese Neumann are a summary of part of the author's book (pp. 130-32). In my article (p. 417) I did not conceal the fact that I am quite impressed by the evidence of a number of experts who declared Therese hysterical during the period of her chronic ailments and that of her sudden cures, though out of fairness I did note that the hysteria hypothesis is rejected by a number of physicians and other observers. Hence there seems to be little disagreement between my critic and myself on that score. That this previous hysteria of Therese Neumann should be seriously envisaged when we are discussing her present visions, ecstasies and stigmata, is so evident as hardly to need the authority of Pope Benedict XIV and St. Theresa of Avila to prove it. This, however, does not mean to imply that Father Siwek has not done excellently in pointing out "the principles of the Doctors *quorum laus est in Ecclesia.*"

A pertinent question then is: what kind of hysteria did Therese Neumann suffer? I was of the opinion that the distinction between phenomenological and characterological hysteria—a distinction for which I gave due credit to Dr. Albert Niedermeyer—might clarify matters. I also expressed the idea (p. 419) that Father Siwek implied the same distinction without formally stating it. It now appears that he does not approve of it. When speaking of the relationships between stigmatization and hysteria in the foregoing point five, he told us that he had no objection to the term phenomenological hysteria in the sense of psychosomatic reactivity and seemed to oppose it to "hysteria properly called." Now in the present point six he defines the latter as "both characterological and phenomenological." I believe that the disagreement is only

apparent, but I likewise believe that my honored censor delights in exploiting differences. There may be a difference of terms, but is there a difference in fact? It never occurred to me that anyone would interpret characterological hysteria as limited only to character traits. Characterological hysteria not only reveals itself in such traits as selfishness, self-assertion, lack of trustworthiness and the like, but also in the physiological symptoms of hysteria such as seizures, convulsions, spasms, paralysis and so on. On the other hand, phenomenological hysteria may show itself in all or some of the latter phenomena, without the characterological opprobrium usually attached to the term hysteria. In my opinion, therefore, the term of characterological hysteria coincides pretty much with Father Siwek's "hysteria, properly called."

The great majority of observers hold that Therese Neumann, either now or in her youth, has little evidence of the character defects which make characterological hysteria obnoxious. I, therefore, expressed as my opinion that the hysteria from which the Konnersreuth girl allegedly suffered up to the year 1926 was of the phenomenological type.

The question then arises whether she was still hysterical in the phenomenological sense, as from 1926 and even now. Father Siwek charges me with omitting as "most important" an episode that took place in 1927, in the course of the well-known observations of the nuns, and which he maintains as clearly hysterical.[4] But is this episode so important? A person supposedly hysterical, either in the phenomenological or characterological sense, is not cured overnight. One who is hysterical in 1926 can hardly be expected to be free from all the symptoms in 1927. Let us therefore allow for the sake of argument that Therese Neumann was hysterical in the sense of psychosomatically reactive, during that year or even later.

My concern was about the value of Father Siwek's argumentation which expressed his substitution-hypothesis. It will be noted that this argument, couched in the form of a question, contains two different propositions. We venture to disassociate the two. First: in the supposition that Therese Neumann no longer exhibits paralyses, spasms, or convulsions, is such sufficient proof to state *with evidence* that she is completely cured of her hysteria? My answer would be: No or *transeat*. Second: in the supposition that she no longer has paralyses, etc., is such equally sufficient proof

for stating *with evidence* that the marvelous phenomena following these seizures are a mere substitution? Once again, my answer is: No. Without begging the question, we have no evidence and this is what I pointed out in my article. At the most, one might express a suspicion. In fact, Father Siwek so expresses himself in his present article and within the span of a few lines very carefully uses the word "perhaps" three times. "Are not perhaps Theresa's visions different symptoms of the same illness from which she suffered before her vision occurred?" Such is not impossible, but we need a great deal more evidence to conclude that it is so. Lacking this evidence, the reference to substitution stands as mere conjecture.

Father Siwek advances the conviction that Therese "was never perfectly cured of her ailments." Other authors, equally well versed in "the psychological and theological analysis of Therese's visions and ecstasies" convey a different conviction. But even if the woman is not completely cured, we can only suspect, but not prove, that substitution has taken place.

There is an admission in the article that "at present we do not hear of any actual seizures of Therese" and the author rightly observes that this fact constitutes a purely "negative argument" (I note in passing and with some amusement that my respected antagonist capitalizes the word "logic").

(7) Did I really think that the hypothesis of vicarious menstruation had been expressed "in too absolute a manner" by Father Siwek? This is what I said: "Siwek advances it by way of explanation in the case of Therese Neumann though *hesitatingly*" (p. 43). The rest of the paragraph seems rather confusing, *salva reverentia*. Father Siwek's own statement was (p. 91) that in women alone stigmata bleed copiously. I questioned the statement, adducing the case of P. Pio di Pietrelcina whose wounds not only bleed copiously but is a case wherein the menstruation hypothesis is scarcely applicable. Father Siwek now seems to answer my objection by referring to a footnote citing the opinion of Carl Schroeder. According to this opinion—and it did not originally escape me as Father Siwek infers—the reason for periodical bleeding is not always to be sought in vicarious menstruation. In other words, the hypothesis has only a limited extension, which was all I wanted to demonstrate. There follows the remark on his part

now: "the bleeding in stigmatized persons can be explained sometimes by vicarious menstruation, and in some cases by other circulatory disorders." Yet might there not be a third possibility, namely, that in some cases regardless of whether they are induced naturally or supernaturally stigmata are real wounds and wounds happen to bleed when they are open? This indeed seems to be the case of P. Pio, whose stigmata are reported to bleed not periodically but almost constantly.

(8) I am grateful to Father Siwek for trying to clarify his position on the question of the visions of Therese Neumann and their possible natural or supernatural origin. Even so, the attempt proves still unsatisfactory to me. No one will gainsay that every event taking place in the world requires the *concursus divinus*. Indeed this is so true that events attributable to diabolical forces do not happen without the *concursus divinus*. That is why Father Siwek's observation, namely, "that Theresa's visions are not the effect of diabolical forces; that, consequently they come from God," carries with it the implication of being enigmatical at best.

The principal source of my dissatisfaction is found in Father Siwek's ambiguous use of the term *modus quo*. Let us briefly repeat the *status quaestionis* as I presented it in my article (p. 415). Allowing full credit to Father Siwek, I accepted his formal distinction between the *manner* in which visions and stigmata may arise and the *ultimate* cause of these phenomena. A person may possess an emotional disposition favoring visions and his or her psychosomatic reactivity might even favor the appearance of stigmata, and the entire process remain purely natural. Such a psychogenic or psychosomatic disposition may be ascribed to Therese Neumann, if there is sufficiently strong evidence for so doing. And granted that such may be the case, the psychogenic disposition concerns the *manner* in which her visions and stigmata arise. If exception be taken as to this term *modus quo,* then we may also call it a proximate cause.

But the question arises, what is the original, initiating, ultimate cause that sets the psychogenic mechanism in motion? In truth it is precisely this, I repeat, that "we are called upon to prove at this juncture." This ultimate cause may be natural, in the sense that the phenomena originate in the person, or diabolic, or divine (supernatural).

Basing his judgment on the criterion of spiritual fruit, Father Siwek admits that diabolic interference is excluded in the case of Therese Neumann, as the initiating cause of her visions and ecstasies. As for natural causes, I mentioned heterosuggestion or autosuggestion. *A priori* we cannot deny that such may be the case with the Konnersreuth woman. But actually in allowing the criterion of spiritual fruit, we should also consider or at least weigh the possibility of the remaining factor, namely, supernatural interference. Following the distinction made by John of St. Thomas (*De gratia, dist.* XX, *a.* 1, *solv. arg.* 4) between *supernaturale ex causa formali, efficienti et finali,* formal supernaturality can be discarded. The criterion of spiritual fruit is *per se* inconclusive for ascribing the phenomena of Therese Neumann to God as the *causa efficiens.* But what about the third form of supernaturality? Supernaturality *ex parte finis* is a natural act described as *ordinatus ad finem supernaturalem ab extrinseco.* Now the ecstasies, visions, and stigmata of Therese Neumann are not only supposed to increase the love of God in her soul, but are admittedly accomplishing the same thing in the souls of numerous spectators, to the point, too, of providing many conversions to the faith. These visions prove to have "moral usefulness" and seem to show "providential intention." They are therefore in the nature of a *gratia externa* benefiting those coming into close or remote contact with them. In other words, God seems to use them as a means of sanctification. I concede that, even so considered, the criterion of spiritual fruit has no apodictic value. I therefore tempered my statement accordingly, yet gave caution that "it should not be lightly put aside."

(9) Once more, and fortunately for the last time, I am accused of not having reproduced correctly the ideas of my esteemed judge. For clarity's sake let me review my version, although I fear these repetitions may already annoy the reader. Father Siwek, I wrote, states that "Therese does not eat, only because she cannot eat. He would account for her condition as having its origin in an illness which makes it physically impossible for her to take food" (p. 51). Compare this with Father Siwek's own words (p. 161): "Indeed, her [Therese's] fasting did commence with an *illness,* with a *natural impossibility to eat.*" Where is my incorrectness? Although I used a paraphrase, did I miss the meaning of the passage? Father Siwek now maintains that his words, as quoted, merely involved the method advised by Pope Benedict XIV. This is not so. These

words clearly express his own opinion, which is repeated in footnote number four of the very same page.

I could let it go at that, but let us press the matter of the method of Benedict XIV a little farther. Because Therese's fasting is presumed to have commenced with an illness, I am ready to agree with my opponent that its supernatural origin should be ruled out, if we were to follow the *method* of Pope Benedict XIV. But Father Siwek seems rather unwilling to apply the *method* rigorously. Why? The author says: "we cannot accept this *theory* any longer." The reader will notice that Father Siwek suddenly shifts from method to theory: that is why I italicized these words. The author presents this theory three pages later (p. 164) and I referred to it in my article (p. 49). I can well understand that Father Siwek considers the eighteenth century theory of metabolism of Pope Benedict XIV as unsatisfactory for explaining prolonged fasting. But why did he not accept this method?

What about the theory which Father Siwek recognizes as most plausible for explaining the fasting of Therese Neumann? He advocates the theory of unconscious fraud. The term—the author now claims in his article—is not to be taken, at least principally, in the psychological sense ordinarily given it, wherein Therese, in a somnabulant or equivalent state, is not conscious of taking her food. Rather, the term is to be understood in the moral sense. The woman is presumed as quite conscious of taking food, but she does not consider the little deception as morally wrong, inasmuch as she feels that her pretense of fasting edifies the good people who accept the ruse. In other words, the author believes that Therese Neumann follows the principle that the end justifies the means. What is to be said of this theory?

The foregoing is somewhat different from that presented in the author's books (p. 164), although he maintains that he already had it in his first publication on Konnersreuth (1931). Of course the frame of mind the author here attributes to Therese Neumann, *a priori,* is not impossible. But where is the evidence? I might also add, what evidence do we have for saying that a person living a relatively active life can survive twenty-five years or more on "little, very little, almost nothing"?

(10) In this final point, Father Siwek informs us that the Catholic Church does not infringe upon his theories if she continues to

recognize the stigmata of Saint Francis of Assisi as supernatural. The author feels that Saint Francis' "love (and vision) seems to have been supernatural." At the risk of being accused of naughtiness I wish to point out that his conclusion "for the same reason his stigmata were supernatural" is more generous than the premise warrants.

Now that both of us have had our say, I return to the remark at the introduction of this reply: when it comes to essentials in the Konnersreuth controversy, there is more that unites than divides us. In my article, I have repeatedly pointed at the former. Father Siwek in his answer deemed it necessary to stress the latter. I regret that this controversy was not more constructive. It could have been.

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THE YOUNG PRIEST'S VIATICUM

Emmanuel. You are the Word that moved
my First Communion Soul. You are the Word
I bosomed through the slender years that proved
a meaning other than Isaias heard.
Emmanuel—indwelling God—as cool
as Bread these chartered hands but lately broke,
now quieting the soul's bewildered pool
while kingdoms ebb to dust, skies blur in smoke.
Abode and bider of these crumbling days,
I am all Yours, and You are more than mine;
Emmanuel, a guide for shrouded ways,
I go surrendered, braced as one divine.
Peace, little flock, not pity in your breast;
Though night arrive, mine is no shattered west.

RAYMOND ROSELIEP

THE TEACHINGS OF THE *CI RIESCE*

On December 6 last, the Holy Father delivered an allocution to the National Convention of the *Unione dei Giuristi Cattolici Italiani,* gathered for an audience at the Vatican. This allocution, known from its opening words as the *Ci riesce,* is one of the most important pontifical statements of recent times. A full translation of this document is carried in the "Analecta" section of this issue of *The American Ecclesiastical Review.*

Unfortunately, the first reports on the *Ci riesce* to arrive in this country were not accompanied by the full text of the document itself. As a result, there were comments and explanations based upon citations which had been taken out of their context, and some of these comments and explanations were inadequate or even misleading. Actually, the allocution is far too important to permit any inaccurate interpretations of its content and its relevance to other contemporary discussions to pass without comment.

The doctrinal content of the *Ci riesce* is divided into two main sections. The first deals with an international and juridical community of sovereign states. This part of the allocution has been analyzed and explained with clarity and competence by Fr. Edward A. Conway, S.J., in a recent issue of *America.*[1] The present article will consider the second part of the *Ci riesce,* that portion of the allocution in which the Holy Father discusses and gives the principles for the solution of a case with which Catholic statesmen and Catholic states may well be faced by reason of legislative action by such an international community.

There are two remarks about the international community itself which must be taken into consideration before there can be any satisfactory discussion about the *casus moralis* with which the second and longer portion of the *Ci riesce* is concerned. First, this higher political unity is something "willed by the Creator, and based upon the unity of [men's] origin, of their nature, and of their end." The movement or tendency towards the international community

[1] The article is entitled "Pius XII on 'the Community of Peoples,' " and is found in *America,* XC, 13 (Dec. 26, 1953), 335 ff.

of sovereign states is something to be favored and promoted. Next, however, there is the highly important observation that the Holy Father does not consider this higher political unity as already fully achieved. The community of nations is described as something "which today has been partly realized but which is striving to be established and consolidated upon a higher and more perfect level." The "superior juridical unity of nations," however, is said to be an entity which "was and still is to be created."

The *casus moralis* with which the *Ci riesce* is concerned is based on a legislative enactment which the Holy Father foresees that the international and juridical community of sovereign states might pass if and when it is finally consolidated and perfected. Such a community will have to face and overcome many practical difficulties, if its operation is to be worthwhile. In dealing with these difficulties, it must be guided by the principle that it will work "within the limits of what is possible and licit, to promote whatever facilitates union and renders it more effective; to hold back *(arginare)* whatever disturbs it; sometimes to put up with something that it cannot correct *(appianare)* but which, on the other hand, must not be allowed to ruin the community of peoples because a higher good is expected from this [community]."

One of the difficulties with which the international community of sovereign states will be faced is based upon the fact that the various sovereign states now existing have different professions of and attitudes toward religion and accept different standards of morality. Hence, the Holy Father believes that the interests of religion and morality will require that the international community draw up some definite rule on these subjects which will be valid for all the territory of the individual sovereign member-states. He views it as probable that such a ruling of positive law would take this form: "Within its own territory and for its own citizens, each state will regulate religious and moral affairs by its own laws. Nevertheless, throughout the whole territory of the community of states, the citizens of every member-state will be allowed the exercise of their own ethical and religious beliefs and practices, in so far as these do not contravene the penal laws of the state in which they are residing."

The *casus moralis* with which the *Ci riesce* is mainly concerned is this: can the jurist, the statesman *(uomo politico)*, and the

Catholic state give their consent to such a ruling when there is a question of entering or of remaining within the community of peoples?

Basically, the question applies to the Catholic state itself, and to those who are placed in charge of it. It asks whether or not it would be morally licit for the government of a Catholic state to bring that state into a constituted, juridical, international community of sovereign states or to allow the Catholic state to remain within such a community if the community had issued as authoritative for all its members a regulation such as that described above.

The most important factor in all the teaching of the *Ci riesce* is the insistence by the allocution that there is no simple affirmative or negative complete answer which can be made to the practical problem under consideration.

In showing how this problem or situation must be met and solved, the Holy Father indicates two completely certain moral principles. The men who will be obligated in the sight of God to guide a Catholic state prudently and justly when that state is faced with the necessity of choosing to accept or not to accept membership in an international community of states under the circumstances the Holy Father has described in his *casus moralis* must accept these principles as true, then judge and evaluate the conditions actually existent at the time when they are faced with this decision in the light of these principles, and finally follow the necessary practical directive which the Holy Father gives and upon which he insists in the *Ci riesce*. Otherwise they will be culpably remiss in their duty of guiding the state entrusted to their care.

The two principles which these men must accept as true and which must serve to guide their decisions are these:

(1) That which is not in accord with truth or with the standard of morality has, objectively, no right to exist, no right to be taught, no right to be done. Or, to put it in another way, "no human authority, no state, no community of states, whatever their religious character may be, can give a positive command or a positive authorization to teach or to do what would be opposed to religious truth or moral good."

(2) Sometimes, in the interests of a higher and more extensive good, the state can legitimately refrain from hindering or impeding, by coercive civil law or directives, what is objectively opposed to the truth and to moral good.

The Holy Father has been very careful to present this second principle clearly, and to show that it is one thing actually and positively to approve an erroneous teaching in the field of religion or a moral evil, and quite another thing merely to refrain from hindering or impeding such deviations. The text of the allocution focuses attention on the fact that there really are certain circumstances in which it can be said that a man who is in a position to hinder or to repress what is objectively untrue or immoral has not received from God any command, any duty, or even any right to impede or suppress it.

The *Ci riesce* also takes cognizance of the fact that there is such a thing as a real duty to repress and to hinder religious and moral deviations. Nevertheless, the Holy Father assures us, if we try to represent this duty as universal and absolute, we are mistaken. The statement that "religious and moral deviation ought always to be hindered whenever possible, because the toleration of that deviation is immoral in itself," is, as the allocution tells us, inaccurate "in its unconditioned absoluteness *(nella sua incondizionata assolutezza)*."

The duty of repressing moral and religious deviations is not, then, the supreme and ultimate standard by which the conduct of a statesman is to be measured. There are higher and more general norms to which this duty must be subordinated, and these higher standards are to be found in the consideration of the purpose of the state, of the Church, and now, of the international community of sovereign states. Under certain circumstances, that is, when there is a question of achieving a higher good or of avoiding a more serious evil, these higher standards render it permissible, and sometimes even preferable, not to impede an error or evil which the state would be able to hinder or to repress.

In the light of these two principles, then, it is possible now to give a preliminary or merely speculative answer to the problem which the Holy Father has set forth.

As long as the regulation of the international and juridical community of sovereign states would not order its member-states

positively to authorize or approve (or, of course, to command) what is objectively opposed to religious truth or moral good, but would only bring these states to tolerate or not to impede some of these deviations, acceptance of the regulation and of the international community itself would be theoretically possible for a Catholic state.

The actual question, however, is not theoretical or speculative at all. It is highly practical. The correct judgment of the men who direct a Catholic state faced with the situation the Holy Father describes will have to be an act of what St. Thomas called *prudentia regnativa.* It will concern what is morally right and good in a definite situation, and not with a mere recognition of theoretical possibility. It will have to resolve what the *Ci riesce* designates as the *quaestio facti.*

As the Holy Father puts it, the man who must make the decision must, in the course of forming that decision, "permit himself to be guided by a comparison between the evil *(dannose)* consequences that stem from toleration and those from which the community of states will be preserved through the acceptance of the formula of toleration." He must be guided, furthermore, by a consideration of the good which he can prudently foresee as coming to the community and indirectly to the member-state through the acceptance of this formula of toleration.

Finally, and here is the intensely important practical direction given for the solution of the actual problem, the men in charge of a Catholic state which is faced with this decision must seek the judgment of the Church, or, in other words, have recourse to the Holy See itself, if their decision is to be morally correct. The Sovereign Pontiff, as the one visible head of the universal Church militant, is the only man who is competent to speak for the Church universal in matters of international import.

The *quaestio facti* can only be resolved by an honest and intensive investigation. The Holy Father makes it clear that advantages and disadvantages would follow from the acceptance by a Catholic country of a ruling of the type he has described. A highly important lesson, first brought out explicitly in the *Ci*

riesce, is contained in his insistence that the men in charge of the Catholic state must, when obliged to make this decision, take into consideration not only the benefits and the evils that would affect their own nation and the Catholic Church within it, but must also keep in mind the effects their decision would have on the condition of the universal Church and of the entire international community of sovereign states.

The rather forceful reminder in the text of the allocution, to the effect that the Holy See must be consulted in this matter before any final decision is reached, is undoubtedly another lesson of great practical moment set forth in this document. The Holy Father has taught very clearly that the *quaestio facti,* the actual concrete problem with which Catholic nations will be faced when they are presented with a ruling such as that depicted in the *Ci riesce,* cannot be rightly resolved without hearing and accepting the judgment of the Sovereign Pontiff himself.

The last two sections of the allocution insist upon the fact that the Church itself has always been guided by the two principles enunciated by the Holy Father both in its own conduct and in the agreements or concordats which it has concluded with various states over the course of the years. With regard to what is religiously false or morally evil, "there never has been, and there is not now, any vacillation or compromise in the Church, either in theory or in practice." On the other hand, where it was possible for the Church to repress or hinder things which are objectively erroneous or evil, it has, *in certain circumstances,* always refrained from acts of hindrance or repression. The Holy Father asserts, furthermore, that the Church is actually doing this today, and that it will continue so to act in the future, whenever it is confronted with the same necessity. He likewise insists that the Church acts in this way "always for higher and more cogent motives."

In other words, here, as elsewhere in the allocution, the Holy Father also drives home the lesson that the highest duty, the supreme obligation, of the Catholic state definitely is not that of refraining from hindering or impeding what is objectively false in matters of religion or evil in the field of morality. Sometimes it is right and prudent to act against error and evil, at other times

and under different circumstances it is right to allow some of them to go without active opposition, although always, of course, without positive approval. The supreme norm which has guided the activity of the Church in these affairs, and which must likewise guide the conduct of its children, is the common good, the common good of the state and the people directly concerned, and, ultimately, the common good of the universal Church and, obviously, of the community of sovereign states as a whole.

Finally, the *Ci riesce* invites students to look for and to find in the texts of the various concordats which the Church has made with sovereign states over the course of the years the effects of these two principles. Sometimes it happens that, in these concordats, the Church and the state with which it is dealing express a common religious conviction. At other times it is clear that the Church merely tolerates (always for the sake of a greater and more precious good) certain evils and errors to which the other signer of the concordat is attached.

While he is dealing with the subject of concordats, the Holy Father takes the opportunity to bring out a truth which has been contested or questioned in recent years. He insists that the Church "in principle or as a thesis *(per principio, ossia in tesi)* cannot approve the complete separation between the two powers [Church and state]."

Here the *Ci riesce* deliberately employs a terminology which has been in common use among Catholic theologians and jurists since the middle of the nineteenth century. The *thesis* is the principle, the truth of the divine law itself. Complete separation of Church and state is opposed to the divine law, and, as such, it is something to which the Catholic Church cannot give any positive approbation. The *hypothesis,* the correlative to which the thesis is immediately referred, takes in actually existent conditions which influence the attitude of any given civil society with reference to the one true Church of Jesus Christ. Under these conditions a *limited* separation of Church and state may be and sometimes is licit.[2]

[2] Cf. Ferdinand J. Moulart, *L'église et l'état,* 4th edition (Louvain and Paris, 1895), pp. 262-412; Cardinal Ottaviani, *Institutiones iuris publici ecclesiastici,* 3rd edition (Vatican Press, 1948), II, 88-100; Laurentius R. Sotillo, S.J., *Compendium iuris publici ecclesiastici,* 2nd edition (Santander, 1951), pp. 225 f.

It is interesting to note that, on this point, the *Ci riesce* restates and develops some of the principal teachings set forth by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical *Immortale Dei.* In this document, Pope Leo repeated and confirmed the condemnation issued by his predecessor Pope Gregory XVI against the teaching of those who advocated "that the Church be separated from the state, and the concord between the secular and the ecclesiastical authority be dissolved."[3] The *Immortale Dei* likewise brings out the fact that the Church "deems it unlawful to place the various forms of divine worship on the same footing as the true religion, but does not, on that account, condemn those rulers who, for the sake of securing some great good or of hindering some great evil, allow patiently custom or usage to be a kind of sanction for each kind of religion having its place in the state."[4] On this point, Pope Pius XII adds the reminder, in the *Ci riesce,* that the great good to be gained and the serious evil to be avoided must also be reckoned in terms of an international community of sovereign states, and, of course, of the universal Church militant itself.

Now, to return to the solution of the *casus moralis* with which the papal allocution deals: could a Catholic state licitly enter or remain within an international and juridical community of sovereign states which had issued a regulation that the free exercise of a religious or moral belief or practice considered legitimate in one of the member-states should not be impeded within the territory of that Catholic state by coercive state laws or directives?

According to the teachings of the *Ci riesce,* there would be theoretically or in the abstract no objection to the acceptance of such a regulation by a Catholic state as long as the ruling of the international community did not demand a positive approbation of anything false in the line of religion or evil in the realm of morals.

Actually, and in practice, it would be the duty of the men in charge of the Catholic state to investigate the good and the evil which might prudently be foreseen as consequences of the acceptance of this regulation. If the good which would accrue to the

[3] The translation used is that of Father Wynne's *The Great Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII* (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1903), p. 125.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 127.

nation itself, to the Church within that nation, to the international community, and to the universal Church would seem to outweigh the bad effects which would likewise follow from the acceptance of that regulation, the acceptance by the Catholic state would seem to be licit, or even obligatory. Otherwise it would not.

In any event, when such a choice must be made, it will be the duty of the men in charge of the Catholic state to consult with and to be advised by the Sovereign Pontiff himself. The Vicar of Christ is the only man who is competent to direct in matters which, like this, have reference to the good of the universal Church militant.

During the past several years there has been a discussion among Catholic writers on some matters of theology and public ecclesiastical law on the subject of Church and state. The teachings of the *Ci riesce* affect some of the questions treated in this discussion. Three points are especially worthy of mention.

(1) The allocution employs the term *"Stato cattolico."* Indeed, the concept of the Catholic state is one of the key notions used in this document. The term is applied to modern states, to civil societies which will have relations with a still uncompleted juridical international community of sovereign states. Hence, it would seem idle to maintain in the future that this term is inept or that it has no clear meaning, or that it can legitimately refer only to civil societies or kingdoms of times past.

(2) The allocution asserts that "what does not correspond to the truth and to the moral standards has, objectively, no right to exist, to be taught, or to be done." As a result we can expect that, in the future, there will be no objections raised against the teaching or the terminology of writers who hold that, in itself, error has no rights. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that Cardinal Ottaviani, in his article in the May, 1953, issue of *The American Ecclesiastical Review,* commented adversely on the practice of objecting to the kind of statement which now appears in this pontifical allocution.[5]

(3) It is certainly no longer feasible to reprove the teaching that,

[5] Cf. Cardinal Ottaviani's article, "Church and State: Some Present Problems in the Light of the Teaching of Pope Pius XII," in *The American Ecclesiastical Review,* CXXVIII, 5 (May, 1953), 330 f.

objectively, a complete separation of Church and state is an evil. Likewise it would appear that henceforth the legitimacy of the explanation of relations between Church and state in terms of thesis and hypothesis will be acknowledged.

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THE COMMISSION OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

Among the almost forty universities and athenea in the world which at the present time bear the title of "Pontifical," the Catholic University of America holds a place of distinction both in the ranks of these other renowned universities and in the glorious line of schools founded in Europe by Supreme Pontiffs through the centuries, schools that in the course of history passed to other administrations.

The strength of this University is in its classrooms where the students are instructed by a faculty not only specialized and expert in their various subjects, but united in faith in the *Christian Tradition.* Thus, behind the faculty of this Pontifical Institute are the Holy See and the Church; and the Church represents centuries of learning, learning that through the *Studia Generalia* and the ancient *Scholae* goes back to the Divine Teacher, Jesus Christ Our Lord. For, although these schools expanded their initial work by teaching new subjects, they never departed from the doctrine of Christ.

Briefly, the essence and power of Christian Tradition is to serve truth at any cost, and thus to activate the program announced by Christ: "I have come into the world to bear witness to the truth" (*John,* 18:37).

—Archbishop Cicognani, in his address at the installation of Bishop McEntegart as the eighth rector of the University.

Answers to Questions

THE SUNDAY SERMON

Question: What is to be said of the custom, fairly common in our country, of entirely omitting sermons at Sunday Masses during the summer months?

Answer: The Code of Canon Law (*Can.* 1344, § 1) imposes on pastors the obligation of delivering a homily to their people on Sundays and holydays of obligation, especially in the Mass which is attended by the greatest number of people. The Third Plenary Council of Baltimore prescribes that on all Sundays and feast days, *even in summer,* there shall be a sermon of at least five minutes duration, if time permits, all custom and pretext to the contrary notwithstanding (*Concilii Plen. Balt. Acta et Decreta,* n. 216). Surely, it seldom happens that there is no time for even a five-minute sermon on Sundays. According to Abbo-Hannan, authors hold that it is a mortal sin to omit Sunday sermons for a month (*The Sacred Canons* [St. Louis, 1952], II, p. 580, note).

THE RIGHT OF A CATHOLIC CHILD TO A CATHOLIC SCHOOLING

Question: My brother, married a little over a year, has one child. He and his wife are having a difficult time financially, trying to pay for their home and furniture, etc. Now his pastor, planning to build a parochial school, has assessed my brother to the amount of $300, to be paid within a year. While the young couple are willing to make an offering within their means, it is utterly impossible for them to contribute $300 within a year. The pastor has threatened that if this sum is not given, he will not allow their child (or children) to attend the school in years to come. Is it within the pastor's right to follow such a procedure?

Answer: A pastor would certainly be guilty of grave sin if he excluded a child from the parochial school merely because its

parents are unable to pay a sum of money, determined by him, toward the erection of the building. He would be manifesting a deplorable failure to realize that he may not measure out his pastoral care for his flock and the facilities of the parish in accordance with the amount of money different individuals or families contribute. He would be failing grievously in denying Catholic children the opportunity of a Catholic education to which they have a right as members of the parish. And he would be fostering in his parishioners a spirit of anticlericalism, which is so easily aroused when people feel that a priest is manifesting an excessive interest in the accumulation of money, even though it is for parish projects.

THE SCAPULAR MEDAL

Question: When and by whom was permission given to substitute the scapular medal for the cloth scapular?

Answer: General permission for this substitution was granted Dec. 16, 1910, by the Congregation of the Holy Office, with the approval of Blessed Pope Pius X. The Pope on this occasion expressed his desire that Catholics would continue to use the cloth scapular in preference to the medal (cf. *AER,* XLIV, 4 [April, 1911], 454). Previously to this general concession there was a special privilege to make this substitution, which could be granted by certain missionaries in Africa to the natives (cf. *AER,* XLII, 6 [June, 1910], 752).

FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.SS.R.

BOWING THE HEAD

Question: At Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament does the celebrant bow his head at the name of Mary if a hymn is sung in her honor between the *O Salutaris* and the *Tantum ergo*? Likewise, does the celebrant at Holy Mass bow his head at the name of Our Lord when reciting the three communion prayers, beginning "Domine Jesu Christe etc."?

Answer: Our inquirer is perhaps thinking of the custom of removing the birettum, when in choir, at the name of Our Lady. At Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament one does not bow at the name of Our Lord or Our Lady if he is kneeling.

The rubrics tell the celebrant of Holy Mass to incline the body moderately for the recitation of the communion prayers prior to receiving the Sacred Host. And since he is already bowed he does not bow his head when he pronounces the Holy Name.

CONSECRATED ALTAR PROBLEMS

Question: How many crosses are to be carved into the *mensa* of an altar to be consecrated? What are the instructions concerning the permanence of the altar before it can be consecrated?

Answer: For the purpose of consecration of an altar five simple crosses must be engraved upon the top or table part. They are engraved at each of the four corners, about six inches from the edges but directly above the support. There is an additional cross engraved in the center of the slab that forms the top of the altar. These crosses are not required for the valid consecration of an altar but serve as indicators to the consecrating Prelate where precisely to make the anointings.

The rubrics do not demand that the supports or base of a consecrated altar be one solid piece of stone. Msgr. Collins states that "the support must be constructed upon the pavement of the church, or it ought to be set in the pavement in such a way that it cannot be moved." He states further that though this is not one of the essential elements of a permanent altar it must be observed in order to insure as little danger of desecration as possible. Father Schulte in his book, *Consecranda,* states that the foundation must be solid and built of any material that will give it permanence like brick, cement or stone. Some priests are under the impression that a permanent altar must rest on a stone foundation built up from the ground but there is no law demanding this type of construction. The construction must be such that it will be practically immovable and fixed.

FOLDED CHASUBLES

Question: We have solemn High Mass every Sunday at our church. Since we do not have the folded vestments are we correct in wearing the tunic and dalmatic?

Answer: The folded chasubles sometimes known as the "planetae plicatae" are worn for the Sundays and ferias of Advent and Lent. The Missal rubrics state that the folded chasubles need not be worn in smaller churches. However, in such places the tunic and dalmatic are not worn. The deacon and subdeacon will wear the amice, alb, cincture, maniple and for the deacon the stole. The so-called broad stole is not used in the absence of folded chasubles.

TABERNACLE KEY VIGILANCE

Question: What are the specific regulations about the care of the tabernacle key? Where must it be kept during the day and night when not used at services?

Answer: The Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments issued in 1938 is most positive on the points brought up by our inquirer. The guardianship of the tabernacle key is a grave obligation in conscience of the priest who is entrusted with the custody of a church. The instruction goes on to say that to satisfy the most diligent custody the rector of the church is strictly commanded never to leave the key of the tabernacle on the altar table or in the door of the tabernacle, not even during the morning period when the divine services are celebrated and Holy Communion is distributed, especially if the altar is not in clear view. On the completion of ceremonies, the key shall be kept by the rector either in his house or constantly on his person, all danger of loss being provided against; or it may be deposited in a safe and secret place in the sacristy, which place must be locked with another key. The priest on whom the duty and task of guarding the key ordinarily and immediately devolves is the rector of the church or oratory.

There is a practical danger of losing the key if the priest carries it about on his person. The safest and best solution is to keep

the tabernacle key in a safe place either in the sacristy or in the rectory. Priests should not be satisfied with placing this key under a pile of finger towels in one of the sacristy drawers or hidden in some other spot of the vesting cabinet.

ORATIO IMPERATA

Question: A problem has come up recently about the *oratio imperata.* Our Bishop has decreed that during the Marian Year the oration of the Mass of the Immaculate Conception should be said as the *oratio imperata pro re gravi.* Is this oration omitted in all Masses of the Blessed Virgin? When the oration of the Blessed Virgin is ordered by the rubrics? What of the commemoration of the Blessed Virgin in the *oratio a cunctis*? Are any other feasts other than those of the Blessed Virgin considered to be of the same mystery?

Answer: Father O'Connell states that "in general, the *oratio imperata* is omitted if it is identical with a prayer already said in the Mass—whether the chief prayer or a commemoration—unless it can be suitably replaced by another prayer." He explains that this identity of prayers need not necessarily be in the oration but may occur in the secret and post-communion as well. Basing our opinion on this statement of the author quoted we are under the impression, since our search for a better solution has yielded nothing, that the *oratio imperata* would be omitted on all feasts of Our Lady, when a consecration in her honor is prescribed by the *Ordo* but not when the *oratio a cunctis* is prescribed.

WALTER J. SCHMITZ, S.S.

Analecta

On Dec. 6, 1953, His Holiness Pope Pius XII addressed a discourse to the National Convention of Italian Catholic Jurists. Our Holy Father spoke in Italian on the problems of religious liberty in the growing community of nations. The following is the Vatican Press Office translation of his remarks.

The Discourse "Ci Riesce"

It gives Us great satisfaction, beloved sons of the Union of Italian Catholic Jurists, to see you gathered round Us here and to bid you heartfelt welcome.

In the beginning of October another congress of jurists, dealing with international penal law, gathered in Our summer residence. Your convention is rather national in character, but the subject it is treating, "The Nation and the International Community," touches again the relations between peoples and sovereign states. It is not by chance that congresses are multiplying for the study of international questions, be they scientific, economic or political. The clear fact that relations between individuals of various nations and between nations themselves are growing in multiplicity and intensity makes daily more urgent a right ordering of international relations, both private and public; all the more so since this mutual drawing together is caused not only by vastly improved technological progress and by free choice but also by the more profound action of an intrinsic law of development. This movement, then, is not to be repressed but fostered and promoted.

I

In this work of expansion, communities of states and peoples, whether already existing or only a goal to be achieved, have naturally a special importance. They are communities in which sovereign states, that is to say, states which are subordinate to no other state, are united into a juridical community to attain definite juridical ends. It would give a false idea of these juridical com-

munities to compare them to world empires of the past or of the present, in which different racial stocks, peoples and states become fused, whether they want it or not, into a single conglomeration of states. In the present instance, however, states, remaining sovereign, freely unite into a juridical community.

In this connection, the history of the world, which shows a continuous succession of struggles for power, no doubt might make the establishment of a juridical community of free states seem almost utopian. The conflicts of the past have too often been motivated by a desire to subjugate other nations and to extend the range of one's own power, or by the necessity of defending one's liberty and one's own independent existence. This time, on the contrary, it is precisely the will to prevent threatening conflicts that urges men toward a supranational juridical community. Utilitarian considerations, which certainly carry considerable weight, point toward the working out of peace; and finally, perhaps, it is precisely this mingling of men of different nations because of technological progress that has awakened the faith, implanted in the hearts and souls of individuals, in a higher community of men, willed by the Creator and rooted in the unity of their common origin, nature and final destiny.

II

These and other similar considerations show that advance toward establishing a community of peoples does not look, as to a unique and ultimate norm, to the will of the States but rather to nature, to the Creator. The right to existence, the right to respect from others and to one's good name, the right to one's own culture and national character, the right to develop oneself, the right to demand observance of international treaties, and other like rights, are exigencies of the law of nations, dictated by nature itself. The positive law of different peoples, also indispensable in the community of states, has the office of defining more exactly the rights derived from nature and of adapting them to concrete circumstances, also of making other provisions, directed, of course, toward the common good, on the basis of a positive agreement, which, once freely entered into, has binding force.

In this community of nations, then, every state becomes a part of the system of international law, and hence of natural law, which

is both foundation and crown of the whole. Thus the individual nation no longer is—nor in fact was it ever—"sovereign," in the sense of being entirely without restrictions. "Sovereignty" in the true sense means self-rule and exclusive competence concerning what has to be done and how it is to be done in regard to the affairs of a definite territory, always within the framework of international law, without however becoming dependent on the juridical system of any other state. Every state is immediately subject to international law. States which would lack this fullness of power, or whose independence of the power of any other state would not be guaranteed by international law, would not be sovereign. But no state could complain about a limitation of its sovereignty if it were denied the power of acting arbitrarily and without regard for other states. Sovereignty is not a divinization of the state, or omnipotence of the state in the Hegelian sense, or after the manner of absolute juridical positivism.

III

There is no need to explain to you students of law how the setting up, maintenance and operation of a real community of states, especially one that would embrace all peoples, give rise to many duties and problems, some of them extremely difficult and complicated, which cannot be solved by a simple yes or no answer. Such would be the question of race and origin, with their biological, psychological and social consequences; the question of language; the question of family life, with its relations, varying according to nation, between husband and wife, parents, the larger family group; the question of the equality or equivalence of rights in what regards goods, contracts and persons for the citizens of one sovereign state who either live for a short time in a foreign state or, retaining their own nationality, establish permanent residence there; the question of the right of immigration or of emigration, and other like questions.

The jurist, the statesman, the individual state, as well as the community of states should here take account of all the inborn inclinations of individuals and communities in their contracts and reciprocal relations; such as the tendency to adapt or to assimilate, often pushed even to an attempt to absorb; or contrariwise, the tendency to exclude and to destroy anything that appears incap-

able of assimilation; the tendency to expand, to embrace what is new, as on the contrary, the tendency to retreat and to segregate oneself; the tendency to give oneself entirely, forgetful of self, and its opposite, attachment to oneself, excluding any service of others; the lust for power, the yearning to keep others in subjection, and so on.

All these instincts, either of self-aggrandizement or of self-defense, have their roots in the natural dispositions of individuals, of peoples, of races, and of communities, and in their restrictions and limitations. One never finds in them everything that is good and just. God alone, the origin of all things, possesses within Himself, by reason of His infinity, all that is good.

From what We have said, it is easy to deduce the fundamental theoretical principle for dealing with these difficulties and tendencies: within the limits of the possible and lawful, to promote everything that facilitates union and makes it more effective; to remove everything that disturbs it; to tolerate at times that which it is impossible to correct but which, on the other hand, must not be permitted to make shipwreck of the community, from which a higher good is hoped for. The difficulty rests in the application of this principle.

IV

In this connection, We wish to treat with you who are happy to profess yourselves Catholic jurists, concerning one of the questions which arises in a community of peoples, that is, the practical co-existence (*convivenza*) of Catholic with non-Catholic states.

Depending upon the religious belief of the great majority of citizens, or by reason of an explicit declaration of law, peoples and member states of the international community will be divided into those that are Christian, non-Christian, indifferent to religion or consciously without it, or even professedly atheist. The interests of religion and morality will require for the whole extent of the international community a well-defined rule, which will hold for all the territory of the individual sovereign member-states of the international community. According to probability and depending on circumstances, it can be foreseen that this ruling of positive law will be thus enunciated: within its own territory and for its own citizens, each state will regulate religious and moral affairs

by its own laws. Nevertheless, throughout the whole territory of the international community of states, the citizens of every member-state will be allowed the exercise of their own beliefs and ethical and religious practices, insofar as these do not contravene the penal laws of the state in which they are residing.

For the jurist, the statesman and the Catholic state arises here the question: can they give their consent to such a ruling when there is question of entering and remaining in an international community?

Now, in regard to religious and moral interests, a twofold question arises: the first deals with the objective truth and the obligation of conscience toward what is objectively true and good; the second deals with the practical attitude of the international community toward the individual sovereign state and the attitude of the individual state toward the international community in what regards religion and morality.

The first question can hardly be a matter for discussion and legal ruling between the individual states and the international community, especially in the case of a plurality of different religious beliefs within the international community. On the other hand, the second question can be of extreme importance and urgency.

V

Now to give the right answer to the second question. Above all, it must be clearly stated that no human authority, no state, no community of states, whatever be their religious character, can give a positive command or positive authorization to teach or to do that which would be contrary to religious truth or moral good. Such a command or such an authorization would have no obligatory power and would remain without effect. No authority may give such a command, because it is contrary to nature to oblige the spirit and the will of man to error and evil, or to consider one or the other as indifferent. Not even God could give such a positive command or positive authorization, because it would be in contradiction to His absolute truth and sanctity.

Another question, essentially different, is this: could the norm be established in a community of states—at least in certain circumstances—that the free exercise of a belief and of a religious

or moral practice which possess validity in one of the member states, be not hindered throughout the entire territory of the community of nations by state laws or coercive measures? In other words, the question is raised whether in these circumstances "non impedire" or toleration is permissible, and whether, consequently, positive repression is not always a duty.

We have just adduced the authority of God. Could God, although it would be possible and easy for Him to repress error and moral deviation, in some cases choose the "non impedire" without contradicting His infinite perfection? Could it be that *in certain circumstances* He would not give men any mandate, would not impose any duty, and would not even communicate the right to impede or to repress what is erroneous and false? A look at things as they are gives an affirmative answer. Reality shows that error and sin are in the world in great measure. God reprobates them, but He permits them to exist. Hence the affirmation: religious and moral error must always be impeded, when it is possible, because toleration of them is in itself immoral, is not valid *absolutely and unconditionally.*

Moreover, God has not given even to human authority such an absolute and universal command in matters of faith and morality. Such a command is unknown to the common convictions of mankind, to Christian conscience, to the sources of Revelation and to the practice of the Church. To omit here other Scriptural texts which are adduced in support of this argument, Christ in the parable of the cockle gives the following advice: let the cockle grow in the field of the world together with the good seed in view of the harvest (cf. *Matt.* 13:24-30). The duty of repressing moral and religious error cannot therefore be an ultimate norm of action. It must be subordinate to *higher and more general* norms, which *in some circumstances* permit, and even perhaps seem to indicate as the better policy, toleration of error in order to promote *a greater good.*

Thus the two principles are clarified to which recourse must be had in concrete cases for the answer to the serious question concerning the attitude which the jurist, the statesman and the sovereign Catholic state is to adopt in consideration of the community of nations in regard to a formula of religious and moral toleration as described above. First: that which does not correspond to truth

or to the norm of morality objectively has no right to exist, to be spread or to be activated. Secondly: failure to impede this with civil laws and coercive measures can nevertheless be justified in the interests of a higher and more general good.

Before all else the Catholic statesman must judge if this condition is verified in the concrete—this is the "question of fact." In his decision he will permit himself to be guided by weighing the dangerous consequences that stem from toleration against those from which the community of nations will be spared, if the formula of toleration be accepted. Moreover, he will be guided by the good which, according to a wise prognosis, can be derived from toleration for the international community as such, and indirectly for the member state. In that which concerns religion and morality he will also ask for the judgment of the Church. For her, only He to whom Christ has entrusted the guidance of His whole Church is competent to speak in the last instance on such vital questions, touching international life; that is, the Roman Pontiff.

VI

The institution of a community of nations, which today has been partly realized but which is striving to be established and consolidated upon a higher and more perfect level, is an ascent from the lower to the higher, that is, from a plurality of sovereign states to the greatest possible unity.

The Church of Christ has, in virtue of a mandate from her Divine Founder, a similar universal mission. She must draw to herself and bind together in religious unity the men of all races and of all times. But here the process is in a certain sense the contrary: she descends from the higher to the lower. In the former case, the superior juridical unity of nations was and still is to be created. In the latter, the juridical community with its universal end, its constitution, its powers and those in whom these powers are invested are already established from the beginning, by the will and decree of Christ Himself. The duty of this universal community from the outset is to incorporate all men and all races (cf. *Matt.* 28:19) and thereby to bring them to the full truth and the grace of Jesus Christ.

The Church, in the fulfillment of this her mission, has always been faced and is still faced in large measure by the same problems

which the functioning of a community of sovereign states must overcome; only she feels them more acutely, for she is obligated to the purpose of her mission, determined by her Founder Himself, a purpose which penetrates to the very depths of the spirit and heart of man. In this state of affairs conflicts are inevitable, and history shows that there have always been conflicts, there still are, and, according to the words of the Lord, there will be till the end of time.

For the Church with her mission has been, and is confronted with men and nations of marvelous culture, with others of almost incredible lack of civilization, and with all possible intermediate degrees: diversity of extraction, of language, of philosophy, of religious belief, of national aspirations and characteristics; free peoples and enslaved peoples; peoples that have never belonged to the Church and peoples that have been separated from her communion.

The Church must live among them and with them; she can never declare before anyone that she is "not interested." The mandate imposed upon her by her divine Founder renders it impossible for her to follow a policy of non-interference or *laissez-faire*. She has the duty of teaching and educating in all the inflexibility of truth and goodness, and with this absolute obligation she must remain and work among men and nations that in mental outlook are completely different from each other.

Let Us return now, however, to the two propositions mentioned above: and in the first place to the one which denies unconditionally everything that is religiously false and morally wrong. With regard to this point there never has been, and there is not now, in the Church any vacillation or any compromise, either in theory or in practice.

Her deportment has not changed in the course of history, nor can it change whenever or wherever, under the most diversified forms, she is confronted with the choice: either incense for idols or blood for Christ. The place where you are now present, Eternal Rome, with the remains of a greatness that was and with the glorious memories of its martyrs, is the most eloquent witness to the answer of the Church. Incense was not burned before the idols, and Christian blood flowed and consecrated the ground. But the

temples of the gods lie in the cold devastation of ruins howsoever majestic; while at the tombs of the martyrs the faithful of all nations and all tongues fervently repeat the ancient Creed of the Apostles.

Concerning the second proposition, that is to say, concerning tolerance in determined circumstances, toleration even in cases in which one could proceed to repression, the Church—out of regard for those who in good conscience (though erroneous, but invincibly so) are of different opinion—has been led to act and has acted with that tolerance, after she became the State Church under Constantine the Great and the other Christian emperors, always for higher and more cogent motives. So she acts today, and also in the future she will be faced with the same necessity. In such individual cases the attitude of the Church is determined by what is demanded for safeguarding and considering the *bonum commune,* on the one hand, the common good of the Church and the State in individual states, and, on the other, the common good of the universal Church, the reign of God over the whole world. In considering the "pro" and "con" for resolving the "question of facts," as well as what concerns the final and supreme judge in these matters, no other norms are valid for the Church except the norms which We have just indicated for the Catholic jurist and statesman.

VII

The ideas We have set forth may also be useful for the Catholic jurist and statesman when, in their studies or in the exercise of their profession, they come in contact with the agreements (Concordats, Treaties, Agreements, *Modus vivendi,* etc.) which the Church (that is to say, for a long time now, the Apostolic See) has concluded and still concludes with sovereign states. The Concordats are for her an expression of the collaboration between the Church and State. In principle, that is, in theory, she cannot approve complete separation of the two powers. The Concordats, therefore, must assure to the Church a stable condition in right and in fact in the State with which they are concluded, and must guarantee to her full independence in the fulfillment of her divine mission.

It is possible that the Church and the State proclaim in a Concordat their common religious conviction; but it may also happen that a Concordat have, together with other purposes, that of forestalling disputes with regard to questions of principle and of removing from the very beginning possible matters of conflict. When the Church has set her signature to a Concordat, it holds for everything contained therein. But, with the mutual acknowledgment of both high contracting parties, it may not hold in the same way for everything. It may signify an express approval, but it may also mean a simple tolerance, according to those two principles which are the norm for the co-existence (*convivenza*) of the Church and her faithful with the civil powers and with men of another belief.

This, beloved sons, is what We intended to treat of with you rather fully. For the rest, We are confident that the international community can banish every danger of war and establish peace, and, as far as the Church is concerned, can guarantee to her freedom of action everywhere, so that she may be able to establish in the spirit and heart, in the thoughts and actions of men, the Kingdom of Him who is the Redeemer, the Lawgiver, the Judge, the Lord of the world, Jesus Christ, who rules as God over all things, blessed forever (*Rom.* 9:5).

While with Our paternal good wishes We follow your work for the greater good of nations and for the perfecting of international relations, from the fulness of Our heart We impart to you, as a pledge of the richest divine graces, the Apostolic Benediction.

Book Reviews

COSMOLOGY. By Kenneth Dougherty, S.A. Peekskill, N. Y.: Graymoor Press, 2nd ed., 1953. Pp. 190. $3.00.

The excellence of Father Dougherty's text-book on *Cosmology* is justifiably indicated by the appearance of a second edition within a year of its first publication. It has been adopted as the official handbook for the study of the philosophy of nature in over twenty colleges and universities. Undoubtedly, the polishing process achieved in the presentation of the original notes for classroom discussion is in great measure responsible for the succinct, clear and efficient exposition of the traditional cosmological doctrines and their bearing upon the data furnished by modern empiriological sciences.

Having stated his purpose to treat of mobile being *qua* mobile being, Father Dougherty repeatedly refers to this position throughout the text, thus removing the usual difficulties encountered by students who fail to grasp the philosophical, as distinguished from the empiriological, approach to nature. In the first part of his treatise due consideration is given to the intrinsic principles of mobile being in its static and dynamic phases, presented in the explanation of the accidents of quantity and quality and associated properties. The second part deals with the extrinsic principles of the universe of mobile being, namely, efficient causality and purpose finality, as well as with related topics.

The subject matter is presented in true scholastic fashion, adopting the logical method of stating doctrines in the form of theses and establishing proofs in the form of syllogisms. In a brief *status quaestionis* necessary explanations of terms and the pin-pointing of problems serve to orient the reader and student in the vast and complicated field of cosmology. Each chapter is preceded by an outline and ends with a list of suggested readings (in English only) and pointed review questions.

A cursory comparison of the two editions reveals that the author has provided some useful *addenda* in the form of a glossary of scientific terms and timely references to contemporary reports on philosophy and science in America, the Vienna School of logical empiricism (Philip Frank) and the recent photographs of planets made at Mt. Wilson.

This brief and highly readable text merits the attention of every student and priest. For the former, the book serves as a useful introduction and compendium in the field of cosmology; for the latter, the book

provides a quick summary of topics of interest for the busy priest, e.g., miracles and the new attacks upon them, an appraisal of atomic science in the light of scholastic thought and principles, etc. The numerous illuminating examples and pertinent illustrations furnish enlightenment and grist for many an intellectual conversation on the philosophy of the world.

MAURICE J. GRAJEWSKI, O.F.M.

NORMS FOR THE NOVEL. By Harold C. Gardiner, S.J. New York: The America Press, 1953. Pp. 180. $2.00.

This book is an expanded re-issue of the pamphlet, *Tenets for Readers and Reviewers,* published in 1942 by Father Gardiner, the literary editor of the Jesuit weekly *America.* It is good that he has issued this work again. There is so much disagreement over the function of a Catholic book review and there is so much controversy over what we should look for in a "Catholic" novel, that an attempt to bring some of the issues to the front and to discuss them is certainly welcome. In general, it is Father Gardiner's purpose to supply book reviewers and readers with a set of principles by which to guide their judgment when facing the problems raised by the modern novel. The two questions which he asks in the introduction set the plan of the book: do the norms of morality have any bearing on the novelist's art, and, if so, what bearing? and, what is the art designed to achieve?

Under the heading of five principles Father Gardiner attempts to discuss the moral issues that are raised particularly by the use of objectionable material in novels. Throughout this section he always tries to see the moral issues from the point of view of an artist who must, after all, be true to the demands of his material. At the same time, he never yields the morally right to the artistic, if it is such when it is involved in the immoral. Added to this section is a discussion of the total problem of realism. Father Gardiner rejects that type of realism we call naturalism for the sterile thing it is. However, he introduces a type of realism, which he calls, "ideal," that faces the facts demanded by the subject matter but never loses sight of the "vision" that is behind them.

In the second group of essays, the author faces the problem of the art of the novel from a Catholic's point of view. It is a problem closely related to the one before it and one which few Catholic writers have discussed as clearly as Father Gardiner has. He uses the notion of "intellectual joy" in such a way as to find new applications for a term that is almost hackneyed. His theory that the ideal, the heroic, and

a recognition of the ends and purposes of life belong to the very essence of good novel-writing brings a fresh concreteness to those words and phrases. And under the heading of "Literature, Understanding and Charity," he gives a new twist to the notion of catharsis which is worthy of the Thomistic tradition of bending Aristotle to the uses of God. The final essay is aimed at the reader. Father Gardiner asks that reading be creative in that the reader strive to recognize the author's purposes, that he seek to give some personal response to his view of life. Such a response demands a willingness to face the unpleasantness of an unsettled mind since any good book forces a reader to ask himself new questions. To read in any other way is to condemn oneself to a perpetual infancy.

This book is difficult to evaluate. Father Gardiner seems to be pioneering in the right direction when he makes it the critic's function to be a guide more than a censor; when he calls for a willingness to grant a serious author good intentions; when he is content to leave much to the good will of the educated Catholic conscience. If there is discussion of this book, it will all be for the good. We need to clarify a Catholic criticism that deals sincerely with the demands of art. So it is hoped that this book will provoke a wide discussion of his norms. It is time for Catholic criticism to face the fact that there is an intelligent audience who wish to find in the critic "opportunities and incentives to read more effectively for themselves." This is what Father Gardiner has tried to be. If his guides are not so clearly marked as some of us would like, the fault is probably with the newness and difficulty of the task he has set before him.

JOHN P. MCMANUS, S.S.

BEDE JARRETT OF THE ORDER OF PREACHERS. By Kenneth Wykeham-George, O.P., and Gervase Matthew, O.P. Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1952. Pp. viii + 168. $3.25.

While reading the present volume the reader may be struck by the thought of being separated from its subject, Fr. Bede Jarrett, by a veil of time. It seems almost as though the book had been written too late. Very likely it would have made an earlier appearance except for the Second World War. In any case the biography is full of a characteristically English reserve which prevents the reader from becoming fully acquainted with the truly great Dominican.

Fr. Bede Jarrett died in 1934 at the age of fifty-two. He was seventeen when he chose to become a priest and a Dominican. He made his novitiate at Woodchester, went on to Hawkesyard Priory to pre-

pare for the priesthood, then went back to Woodchester, where, in 1904, he was ordained a priest. His next years were spent in study in history and theology at Oxford and Louvain. On his return to England in 1908 he was appointed assistant priest at St. Dominic's Priory in London.

He yearned to study but accepted the work of the active ministry as God's will, throwing himself into it with great zeal. His study and experiences left their traces in his many sermons and books. *Medieval Socialism, St. Antonio and Medieval Economics* and *Meditation for Layfolk,* written at this time, as well as others written afterwards, demonstrate both his interest in history and his solicitude for the people.

During his six years as assistant priest in London he developed his ability as a preacher. Since he could not sing he felt called upon to preach to make up for the defect. His preaching and writing made him one of the most prominent English Dominicans. In 1914, at thirty-three, he was elected Prior of London. Two years later he was unanimously elected Provincial of the English Dominicans. The Provincial is elected to a four-year term of office. Father Bede was elected to four terms as Provincial. He served the Order in a period of revival and consolidation. The terms of his office were full of many successes but also had some failures, as some of his plans for establishing new foundations came to naught. So great had his reputation grown within the Order that at the General Chapter in Rome in 1929 he received 31 out of 86 votes in the election to the Master Generalship. He was relieved that he was not elected. During his sixteen years as Provincial he did much travelling on the business of the Order. His trips carried him to nearly every part of the United States and in every place he preached and lectured. His American friends made possible one of his dearest visions, the return of the Dominicans to Oxford. He had the happiness to be elected Prior of Oxford after his term as Provincial ended in 1932. Illness struck him down as he was serving in this capacity. He resigned his Priorship since he realized that his recovery from the stroke he had suffered would take many months. He seemed to be recovering but died quite suddenly March 17, 1934.

This outline has been filled out by the two authors with abundant citations from Father Bede's correspondence. For one whose policy was, "never to write, only to answer," he seems to have done quite an amazing bit of writing in letters and post cards. Perhaps this is owing to a deeply rooted conviction, which he learned as a novice from the writings of Aelred of Riveaux, "that friendship which can

be broken was never a friendship." So great was his faculty for making and retaining friends that the authors have devoted a lengthy chapter to it. Examining in the book the several studies of Father Bede made at various stages in his career it is fairly easy to read in his features qualities essential to friendship. The book concludes with a helpful chapter on his "philosophy of life." Though the work is important as an historical study, unfortunately it has not been equipped with an index.

FRANCIS R. DAVIS

NUN IN RED CHINA. By Sister Mary Victoria, O.P. New York: McGraw Hill, 1953. Pp. 208. $3.50.

The author is the central figure in this narrative which reads like a personal diary from 1949 to 1952. It is not unlike *Calvary in China,* by Rev. Robert W. Greene, M.M. Descriptions of the mission compound, clinic, church, catechists, Communist sentries, inspectors, prisons, courts, confiscations, cruelty and deceit, furnish the background for both accounts which seem to have been experienced simultaneously. This is to be expected, since the Red techniques are never original. They are the outgrowth of the "rubber stamp" method characteristic of the Red domination everywhere.

This personal diary, in spirit if not in form, presents at the outset a poverty-ridden, mal-nourished, diseased, frightened, and worried horde of refugees from North to South China, in 1949. Assistant in the mission clinic, the author heard first-hand the horrible tales that gained them new recruits from every province for their freedom crusade. On the march, they often marked the convent with white chalk, as possible quarters for the retreating army, while the household within was suspended in a void, waiting to be "liberated" by the incoming Red army.

When the Red army finally arrived, the "Hate America!" campaign flourished with myths about Wall Street, American atrocities in Korea, anti-American songs and slogans, and with the delivery of rice sacks stamped—"Down with American Imperialism!" The Youth Corps composed of thousands of boys and girls brought from the country districts were exploited as "the hope of the future," in the indoctrination schools.

Eye-witness of all this in the early stages of the "Red Liberation," the author and her companions became easy prey and ultimate victims of the young hoodlums and of the soldiers lodged in the barracks next-door to the convent.